Is Russia Running Out of Ammunition?

Western Pundits Say YES!

INTRODUCTION

Aleks has drawn up a list of topics that he thought would be of interest to BMA readers. One topic that was timely was the question: Is the production of explosives, propellants, and other materials a bottleneck in the manufacture of artillery shells, rockets, etc. for Russia in the SMO in Ukraine? In other words, will Russia run out of ammunition for the “big guns” any time soon because of manufacturing shortfalls?

I mentioned that this topic is timely, and some of you might think that we are past that point because it seems that the Russo-Ukraine conflict is well past the halfway mark. However, I think that the collective West is not ready to let things fall where they may. Instead, the West will likely continue (proxy) hostilities for some time into the future because, in the words of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, the goal of the West is to weaken Russia. That goal has not been achieved. Further, I think that Russia was well aware of this, and has already taken steps to be prepared for further confrontation, even if it is somewhere other than Ukraine.

BASICS

In order to not bore those readers who are expert in the concepts surrounding propellants and high explosives, I have separated that discussion from this article. You can click this link to access that primer at my Substack site. It is a fundamental description of gunpowder, guncotton, and high explosives. Even some chemistry! Links in that section will bring you back here to continue reading this piece.

MUNITIONS

The weapon platforms used in battle, such as tanks, IFVs, MLRS launchers, and barrel weapons (i.e., cannons) are relatively easily counted in the current conflict in Ukraine. It appears that Russia is well equipped with weaponry, but the issue of replenishment of the ammunition for these weapons is not well known. By “ammunition”, I include rockets, missiles, bombs, and artillery ammunition. These items incorporate steel, aluminum, electronic components, and high explosives. They also require propellants in order to be delivered to their intended targets. In this article, I will focus on the propellants and explosives that are used in the munitions described above. But first some generalizations:

Some of the raw materials necessary for construction of munitions, such as steel, copper, zinc, and aluminum, are probably not in short supply because Russia is a producer of all of these commodities. The metals can be worked into the shapes necessary by forging, casting, or drawing to make the (hollow) shell cases and brass bases for artillery ordnance, or the bodies of the missiles and rockets. This is known technology and is readily scalable to produce large quantities, given that an experienced workforce is available. Due to the strategic nature of these materials, I believe that Russia has maintained an experienced workforce in this industry for at least the last several decades. BTW, this is in stark contrast to the West, which has let this experience languish domestically by offshoring their production.

ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS

Electronic components are used in the guidance systems that control guided missiles, rockets, and smart bombs.   Depending on the complexity of the system, construction of such weapons might present a technical hurdle that could limit production quantities. However, it appears that Russia and her allies have the combined capacity to provide as many assembled systems as is necessary to meet the current needs, and will likely meet future needs as well.

In addition to that, we all know that the famed Ursula von der Lyin’ has exposed the genius of the Russian technicians who have, against all odds, managed to modify the plentiful electronic chips from washing machines to carry out the functions required for guidance systems in these sophisticated airborne munitions!

ROCKETS and MISSILES

The distinction between rockets and missiles has become blurred by technology. Rockets are usually used for applications which require high speed, and short- to medium distance (think air defense). Missiles, on the other hand are standoff weapons that are capable of travelling long distances to reach their target. (Cruise) missiles are usually powered by turbine-type engines which use liquid hydrocarbon fuel (jet fuel), while most rockets use solid fuel propellants (perchlorate), which accelerate the vehicle to extremely fast speeds in a short period of time. The solid fuel propellants are specialty products, and are probably made in sufficient quantities to meet the demand in the current conflict(s).

Both weapon platforms carry high explosive warheads, and the aggregate amount of explosive used for all of these weapons is small relative to the amount used in artillery and other weapons (some missiles carry considerable payloads). It is very likely that Russia will be able to use these weapons without restriction, since they are probably produced with high priority due to their strategic nature.

BOMBS

Conventional bombs have to be carried close to the geographical location of the targets before release. Their use has been very limited due to restrictions in airspace in the conflict zone.

Modern “smart” bombs, however, can glide for over 40 km to a target, guided by electronically-controlled devices attached to the bomb. Either way, bombs do not use propellants, but rely on the altitude of release to allow some lateral movement to reach the target. Bombs can, however, carry a large quantity of high explosives and the effectiveness of smart bombs today is incredible.

The number of bombs used in the Russo-Ukraine conflict has, until recently, been limited because neither side has had air supremacy. However, the retro-fitted smart bombs are finding greater use as Russia uses its air superiority to deliver medium-distance munitions. The production of these weapons, however, is dependent only upon the manufacture of the guidance systems to “bolt on” to the bomb body. The huge inventories of “dumb” bombs made in the past are probably sufficient such that new bomb production is not a limiting factor in sustaining high availability of these weapons.

A special class of bomb is the fuel-air bomb, which is designed to generate an extreme pressure wave within a moderate area where the bomb is detonated. These bombs contain liquids which are dispersed in the atmosphere (aerosol) in the target area prior to detonation. In a matter of seconds, the cloud of fuel is then detonated, and the fuel consumes oxygen in the air during the detonation. The specialty nature of these weapons, and the ready availability of the dispersible liquid fuels, make it likely that there are few limitations to their use when they are deemed necessary.

ARTILLERY

This term refers to any large-caliber weapon system that uses a tube (mortar) or barrel to propel the munition. This includes tanks, howitzers, and other cannon weapons. This category uses the greatest quantity of chemical propellants and explosives due to the very high number of rounds expended every day during modern conflicts.

I will use the 152 mm round as the standard for calculation purposes. Other calibers are used, but 152 mm represents an “average” amount of propellant and explosive over the range of calibers used.

To get a sense of proportion, let’s assume that the desired rate of artillery fire averages 20,000 rounds per day. That is 7.3 million rounds per year. The 152 mm round uses steel shell casings that weigh, at most, 25 kg empty. The steel required for that number of shells is 183,000 metric tons (MT) per year. That equates to 0.24% of Russia’s steel-making capacity (75.6 million MT/yr). I think it is safe to say that Russia has more than enough steel to make the shells required for our “standard” rate of fire. As for the brass (the base holding the propellant), the copper and zinc production by Russia far exceeds the amount needed for the brass, and recycling is common.

Let’s add some further clarity to the calculations. It has been estimated that Russia is currently producing about 200,000 rounds of artillery per month. This rate is expected to at least double, and it would need to triple to meet the 7.3 million rounds per year rate mentioned above. It is probable that reserve inventories are still available for some time to allow a high rate of expenditure for now, and it may not be necessary to fire at a consistent rate of 20,000 rounds per day (even with the Ukraine “counteroffensive”). If we assume that Russia started with 7.3 million rounds at the beginning of the SMO, and they use 20,000 rounds per day but produce only 200,000 rounds per month, then they would run out of munitions for this weapon class within about 17 months from the start. That would be in July of this year.

However, Russia has announced that they have doubled the production of rounds, so they should be producing 400,000 rounds per month now. If we assume that the increase ramped up by February of this year, then Russia would not run out until December, 2023. It has been announced very recently that production has increased to about 20,000 rounds per day (of all artillery), such that the rate of production apparently already more than matches the rate of expenditure. “More than”, because they must account for losses due to enemy actions.

CONCLUSION

Artillery rounds are the most commonly used large-caliber munition in ground warfare. If shortages of strategic munitions would occur, it would likely be a shortage of artillery rounds. In this section, we will compare the estimated consumption of artillery ammunition with the known production of raw materials (chemicals) needed for the production of the propellants and explosives used in these rounds. I have made some not-so-educated guesses about the average usage and the average payload and propellant charge for artillery rounds. These estimates can be compared to Russia’s production capability of the raw materials used in production of these rounds.

First, we itemize the chemicals needed for ammunition production:

1.     Ammonia is the starting material for all of the nitrogen-containing materials used in ammunition. This includes propellants for artillery projectiles, as well as for the explosives contained in the warheads. Russia produces >10 million metric tons of ammonia.

2.     Nitric acid, derived from ammonia, is used directly in the production of explosives and propellants. The production of this acid is not easily discerned, but Russia is a large producer of Nitric acid, because Russia is the world’s largest producer of ammonium nitrate, made by reacting ammonia with nitric acid. Ammonium nitrate in Russia is about 11 million tons per year.

3.     Sulfuric acid is a necessary reactant as well, and Russia produces 12 million metric tons of this product.

4.     Cotton is used in the production of propellants, and this product is readily available and is traded worldwide.

Now, let’s estimate the consumed quantities of propellants/explosives:

It can be estimated that about 193,450 metric tons of nitrogen-containing materials are necessary to produce sufficient quantities of armaments for the current conflict.

In order to compare this requirement to the production of necessary chemicals in Russia, we must apply a factor to account for the proportion of nitrogen-containing starting materials necessary to make the desired products. For both propellants and explosives, this factor is about 60%. Therefore, 0.60 x 193,450 = 116,070 metric tons of ammonia derivative to make this amount of propellant/explosive.

Comparing that amount to the production of, for example, ammonia in Russia, we can see that the ammunition required per year takes up about 1.2% of raw material production.

It is very likely that Russia is self-sufficient in the production of the chemicals necessary to produce the large quantities of ammunition for the big guns of the Russia military.

As Always…

If you like this article, please consider buying me a coffee. A massive amount of work goes into writing a researched article like this. I plan to write more, and Aleks has a list of suggested topics. If you have any suggestions of what you would like to see, please add it in the comment section. Thank you!

ADDENDUM

I have not addressed the amount of nitrocellulose required for small arms. A 7.62 mm cartridge contains less than 50 grains of powder (nitrocellulose), and more than 400 rounds can be made from one kilogram of powder. Put another way, 100 million rounds can be made from 250 tonnes of nitrocellulose. Industrial production can easily make enough powder for small arms, and the propellant is probably not the bottleneck in small arms ammunition production.