I've never doubted it. Schryver called it a feint from the start. Made sense to me.
Then a poster at Martyanov's blog linked to a video of a Russian general in which he confirmed it as a feint.
I posted that link at Mark Wauck's blog, which confirmed it for him.
While all eyes were fixed on the tank convoy to Kiev, Russia not only secured ZNPP, they also secured the computers & docs at a couple dozen biolabs along the border. The specimens were already evacuated, distributed among the other hundreds of biolabs worldwide that my criminal "government" funds.
What I find interesting in the discussion is that the comments seem to demonstrate the uncertainty surrounding Russian intent rather than resolve it.
Some argue Kyiv was a feint. Others argue it was a decapitation strike aimed at Zelensky and the government. Others suggest Russia hoped to take the city if it proved easier than expected. Those are different explanations, not confirmations of a single theory.
The article is strongest when it challenges the assumption that the war can be understood solely through the lens of Kyiv. The southern campaign clearly mattered and produced some of Russia's most significant early gains.
Where I become less convinced is when the argument moves from that observation to the much stronger claim that Kyiv was never a serious objective.
The operation against Hostomel, the advance from Belarus, the multiple axes converging on the capital, and the apparent expectation that the Ukrainian government might collapse all suggest Kyiv held significant importance in Russian planning. The presence of Rosgvardiya and riot-control units is difficult to reconcile with an expectation of a long war. It makes more sense if Moscow anticipated a rapid political collapse and a need to administer territory rather than fight for every street.
The southern campaign also deserves more nuance. Early Russian success there was not necessarily proof that it was always the primary objective. Local collaboration, sympathetic officials, shorter supply lines from Crimea, and different operational conditions all appear to have contributed. Success and priority are not necessarily the same thing.
What seems entirely plausible is that Moscow entered the war with multiple objectives. Secure strategic gains in the south, pressure the government in Kyiv, encourage political collapse, and fix Ukrainian forces around the capital. Those aims are not mutually exclusive.
The strongest claim in the article is not that Russian forces fixed Ukrainian troops around Kyiv. That clearly happened. The strongest claim is that fixing them was the primary purpose of the operation from the outset.
That remains possible.
I am not sure the available evidence allows us to be that certain.
gosh, if you only knew how disgusting the word "Kyiv" sounds for Russian (and also actually for Ukrainian, because Ukrainians are just crazed Russians) ear. It´s like the worst kind of village dialect/ modern slang you can imagine for your native language. "Lindin", "Parir", "New Urk" or something like that :))
I am not surprised Kyiv sounds strange to Russians, but then Kiev looks and sounds wrong to Ukrainians, because the city of Kyiv is Ukrainian not Russian.
The fact is, Chicken Kyiv does not support your argument!
That was Putin's greatest miscalculation, assuming Russian-speaking Ukrainians saw themselves as Russian. And, in many cases, the Russian invasion of the Donbas and Crimea ended whatever sympathy for Russia may previously have existed.
Before 2014, language was often far less politically significant than outsiders assumed. Millions of Ukrainians spoke Russian while still considering themselves Ukrainian. The events of 2014 forced many people to choose between linguistic identity and national identity. Many chose Ukraine.
If language determines identity, then Russia has spent years killing Russian speakers. By that logic, this is not liberation. It is fratricide.
You're welcome to deflect if it blunts the sting of embarrassment, my comment was to alert other readers that you are too biased to even get basic facts straight and, as such, your other commentary should be disregarded wholesale. Perhaps you find it edgy to point out that this is a brother war, but it just further illustrates how disconnected you are from how people on the ground in both of these countries view the situation.
They never had enough forces around to take even the east bank of Kiev.
On the west bank:
2000 paratroopers to take an airport (and surroundings) that the Russians would never use due to the amount of anti-air defenses they'd have to get through to land planes (The paratroopers got in due to surprise). The Ukrainians were so worried about those that they'd essentially turned them into a zoo exhibit, then agreed to let them go since it wasn't worth the manpower to keep them.
A number of troops to keep the crossing at Chernobyl secured (that is how those paratroopers got out).
No ground forces of any significant size massing to support any march on west bank Kiev.
The east bank
Numbers vary a bit but if you average them ~30 000 ground forces.
Ukraine didn't take the 3 day deadline seriously due to the, compared to the target, tiny force. This can be seen by Ukraine not even bothering to even prep the bridges in and around Kiev and taking potshots at anything in the stretch of road they turned into a shooting gallery instead of taking out the few engineering units stuck.
30 000 ground forces is not enough to occupy Kiev, that would take at least 60 000 let alone take and occupy the place in 3 days. Ukraine as defenders had at least a 3:1 advantage in manpower while bunkering down in the most defended area in Ukraine. Just for that and the 3 day deadline Russia would have had to formally declare war so that Russia could send conscripts across the border to get the manpower needed. Which would be around 500 000 ground troops just for Kiev and another 250 000 as screen and pinning force for the rest of the Ukrainian army. Or more then what Russia had available even if you include conscripts without shutting down bases and pulling from the navy & air force.
But it doesn't matter since most civilians (including me at that time) do not know what it takes to take a city like Kiev and saw impressive photos and movies of Russian vehicles just waiting to be blown up. Ukraine and NATO kept up the charade since it was, and still is, a massive morale booster. Plus admitting that your enemy isn't the brain dead incompetent you've been portraying them as isn't conductive for your career when everyone around you is ideologically committed to OTHERING them.
Did the Russians get what they wanted?
Oh no. The goal was to get at least to the outskirts of Kiev so they could make threatening noises with artillery.
That would at least have prevented the successful intervention by Johnson.
Just to put everything perspective.
What Russia did in the south was a blitzkrieg action. The second time ever a blitzkrieg against a, nominally, peer level army succeeded (Well up to the point that Johnson came in and told Ukraine they were wimps for setting up peace talks with Russia). The diversion that was the march on Kiev was the key to that.
If the Ukies had abandoned Kiev to the Russians, the Russians would have had to choose whether to hold a salient into Northwestern Ukraine. They might well have had to pull forces from the effort to secure strategically important Crimea, and put them into a kettle conveniently close to NATO forces.
If the Ukies had abandoned Kiev to the Russians, the Russians likely would have abandoned it too.
"If the Ukies had abandoned Kiev to the Russians, the Russians likely would have abandoned it too."
----------
Yup.
Can't do it all, press forward everywhere to test then support the most vital and/or most successful fronts. Fall back and dress the lines for defense elsewhere (Kherson?), ground is patient and can be re captured later, your men are harder to replace.
Only so many troops were available in 2022, this isn't 1943 when Stalin could keep an apparently endless supply of men moving towards the front, refilling ranks faster than Germans could empty them.
For a start, demographic transition has come & gone so military age young men are at a premium. Also, these guys have more options than in the USSR, they can now "vote with their feet". Hence NOT using draftees outside Russian Federation in the Ukraine war and the unprecedented pay scale offered to volunteers.
Modern soldiers take too long and too many resources to train and equip for the kind of wars we fight now vs. the bad old days when mobilizing a non specialist draftee might cost the USSR a month to 6 weeks basic training (or less on a bad day), a uniform (sleep in your greatcoat, no sleeping bags issued!) and issuing a cheap-ish Mosin rifle or the world's cheapest submachine gun.
"this isn't 1943 when Stalin could keep an apparently endless supply of men moving towards the front, refilling ranks faster than Germans could empty them." - this is also a usual part of Western narrative. USSR had no "endless supply of men" and at this stage of war it was already more German soldiers killed than Soviet troops (in the first stage of the war the numbers were reverced. Don´t forget that the most of all 27 millions dead soviet people in WWII are actual civilians, not soldoers. This kind of numbers are rather typical when the nice and very human civilized Westerners wage their wars
I've looked at the wartime non recoverable casualty figures which are all massive but somewhat contradictory. In total, it seems the USSR never reached 1:1 with the Axis in such casualties, if you consider all the POWs dead in captivity, it gets even grimmer.
And yes, the civilians had the worst of it throughout.
The intent of the SMO was to force the Banderan Kapo Zelenski, to negotiate. If Russia did end up taking Kiev, that would have been hilarious. Then Russia would have to withdraw or find another 200,000 soldiers to help secure the metropolitan area and the supply lines.
Great to read you again, Mike. It is my understanding that there was a large Ukrainian force about to attack in Donetsk and the Russian advance stopped this attack. It also forced the Ukrainians to reallocate forces back to Kiev. Is this correct?
The irony is that Zelensky ordered Zaluzhnyi to defend Kiev at all costs - drawing troops away from the south, yet in 2024 when Zelensky fired Zaluzhnyi the public reason was that he allowed the Russians to occupy the south. It has been obvious for a long time that the advance on Kiev was a fixing operation however, to admit this would crumple the Western narrative we offer of the Russians as being bumbling military buffoons.
What if the aim of the military operation in Kiev was not the capture of the city, but the capture of Zelensky and the Ukronazi junta? For that, Russia would not have needed the same amount of troops as necessary to seize the whole capital.
With such a "decapitation strike" (if you pass me the term), the war could have ended much sooner and with much less bloodbath. After all, I remember reading an article a few years ago (by Simplicius the Thinker, I believe) according to which Russian special forces were only a few kilometres away from Bankova Street, but could not get any farther due to strong Ukrainian resistance.
This is too much NATO workflow. The Russian goal, at least visible in the agreement that was ready to sign, was not a failed state. So removing the leaders and maybe sentencing them to whatever in a show trial is not the Russian style. And who was intended to sign for the Ukrainian side the Istanbul treaty?
But then why venturing that close to Bankova if the aim was just to pin the UAF in Kiev?
I am not saying that diverting the UAF from Donbass was not the main aim, but that Russia may have also attempted to snatch Zelensky as a secondary goal, in order to shorten the war, if the attempt had been successful.
Why should this shorten the war? Some other political leaders from parliament, military or administration would step in. Selensky is a bad politician and diplomat. If some of the die-hard nationalists took over, then the negotiation process could be complicated. And the goals of the SMO are not to gain territory, but, up to this day, the removal of the nationalist elements, neutrality, reduction of the armed forces.
Well... it would be stupid for Russia to let someone from the die-hard nationalists take over from Zelensky once removed! Not sure why they would allow it to happen.
IMO Russia's mistake was not having initiated a SMO to control Kiev immediately after the 2014 coup (if not before that) prior to the Nato-West's massive military buildup of forces & defenses, in order to remove the usurpers and restore the democratically-elected government, just as the Russian integration of Crimea was enabled by thwarting the Ukrainian junta's invasion of Crimea. Undoubtedly Russian Intelligence knew what was going on and heard Nuland's "F___ the EU" phone call, but Putin failed to act decisively (except to preserve the Sevastopol base) and the result is a terrible tragedy with protracted conflict. [Armchair General here.]
1. it would have had to be huge, not sure Russia could have done it then (or now)
2. Nato was a lot lot stronger then and Russia a lot weaker. The risk of a direct war with Nato would have been large. The guiding principle of Russia's invovlement in Ukraine seems to have been to avoid direct confrontation with Nato until they were ready.
From 2020 onwards it has been Nato avoiding direct confrontation with Russia.
but nor was Russia. And be clear nato was a lot lot more unified and stronger in 2014 than it was in 2022 while Russia was much much weaker.
Even now Russia hasn't tried to hold any territory where it doesn't have 75%+ local support. Just how many oblasts do you think Russia would have taken? Even now there is no credible alternative to run Ukraine come peace. Was there an alternative back in 2014? That is why Putin is a great president, he thinks these things through.
I'd say quite the opposite. Note how NATO didn't do jack about Georgia in 2008, nor did they charge in Ukraine in 2014. Hell, NATO is a lot more unified now than in 2022. In 2022, NATO hesitated to send a few crate of old Soviet-era stockpiles. Today, NATO munitions hit Russia and Russian ships are seized, all with total impunity.
Mostly, I see excuses for Russian indecision. Note that NATO didn't worry about popular support. You just do things and the population will always side with whoever is stronger, more ruthless and more brutal.
The US created the crisis in Georgia but NATO did not intervene. Contrast with Ukraine a few years later, where NATO most assuredly intervened, and even today, anyone in europe who expresses an expectation for anything other than Total Victory is treated like he just farted in church.
Russian indecision and dithering simply invites escalation. It also invites excuses for failure.
Nato did not try to intervene in Crimea and Ukraine was not a Nato member, so I don't think the alliance was prepared or mandated to fight Russia. Russia knows about every nook and cranny in Kiev, and Ukraine's military was disorganized in 2014 (remember Debaltsevo) so a covert operation with backup forces would have been sufficient.
Certainly Ukraine was very weak - largely because their best officers and men were innately pro-Russian and quit to joine the rebels. But still Debaltsevo suggests to me that whoever was calling the shots for Ukraine had no clue about Soviet warfare tactics.
But the question in 2014 was not whether Nato would risk fighting Russia but whethe Russia would risk fighting Nato - and it seems to me that Putin was right to not risk it.
Had he tried it could not have been an SMO, it would have had to be a proper invasion - certainly to the Dnieper + Kiev. 3 million men? 4?
Not only was Ukraine's military in disarray, but also the government that was created by the seat of Vicky's pants. A covert operation could have taken the latter down, with backup forces to deal with any resistance. Much like Maduro in Venezuela.
No one was threatened by the Ukrainan government or military. After all the rebels defeated it twice and Kiev needed France and Germany to bail them out at Minsk twice.
But back up forces? Again how many million troops? 3?
Incidentally Venezuela is entirely independent - all rump has there is a single rerpresentative - essentially an ambassador.
The idea that VZ represents some devastating attack by the evil Trump giving him some kind of control is a pure Trumpian fiction. He wants us to believe he is a real nasty MF. That is what US is nowadays. Shout loud because it is carrying only a small stick.
You open e4. What is your second move? Obviously - it depends. If you only know how to act on e5 but not on d5 - may be you shouldn't play chess at all.
Well, chess is limited to 64 fields and few figures. War offers much, much more options. The Russians opened with Kiev (and several other moves at the same time). As in chess, the enemy has a saying too, in war. Obviously, the generals had prepared a lot of contingency plans - bearing in mind the political order.
The Kiev opening had a lot of tasks. Strategically - bring Ukraine to the table, tell NATO we mean business. Operationally - feint, fixing operation, well if Kiev falls (3% expectation rate) take key positions, otherwise causing chaos, cutting Kiev from the West. Tactically - Nuclear (Chernobyl was taken, few days ago Zelensky had told the Munich security conference he intends to build the bomb - some material could have been around), Biolabs - several where taken, Aviation - Gostomel is and was the hub of Antonov, producer and operator of An-124 and An-225, which are and where used for NATO - via SALIS etc. (taking parts, tools, documentation for the Russian An-124, destroying NATO assets).
After all these tasks of the opening where fulfilled, it was time to retreat, because the logistics was extremely vulnerable (one road passing through the Pripyet swamps) and the forces close to NATO. Short NATO logistics, Long Russian logistics. These forces would have been cut off and destroyed. Putting this retreat in relation to the agreement and calling it a good-will-act is another maskirovka.
Ask your favorite ai about operation Danube, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20–21, 1968 -- the essential point being that the ukr bombed the runways at the airport, forcing the supply planes which were already en-route to return to base. Whoever ordered these strikes on Hostomel ensured that even if the ukr natl guard would have fallen to the attack helicopters, the rus move would have been checkmated right then and there.
(i don't know to much about what other airports could have been used to land the heavy Il-76 transport planes; i only know that 'they had to give up and return home.)
As I recall Russia bombed almost all the other airports - suggesting there was neither a massive resupplying intended not a massive evacuation plan if it went wrong
are you actually imagining that russian planes were over kiev that day? .. i remember the stories about the helicopter attack, them holding the airport for a bit before getting routed .. which meant 'they lost' -- which is why i remember it so vividly, has always bothered me that people could not look beyond the stuck convoy then; and even that stuck convoy was a kind of a loss.
so.. it was a kind of fixing operation, but it wasnt the ukr but rus that had gotten (itself) fixed there. still a valiant effort, but lets stick with reality please. it won't take you long to find the details about the op.
No Hostomol is exactly how you would plan a fixing operation - especially if the real goal was to shore up Donbas. West of Kiev is perfect - and they all got out.
You bought the story Russia was selling.
Recall in Soviet or WW2 East warfare, getting defeated means losing all the blood and treasure, it does not mean chasing them away with few casualties on either side. Getting "routed" is meaningless except in US terminology where PR is the only thing that matters and to hell with HR.
The stuck convoy - did it take losses? Not that I ever saw confirmed.
I've never doubted it. Schryver called it a feint from the start. Made sense to me.
Then a poster at Martyanov's blog linked to a video of a Russian general in which he confirmed it as a feint.
I posted that link at Mark Wauck's blog, which confirmed it for him.
While all eyes were fixed on the tank convoy to Kiev, Russia not only secured ZNPP, they also secured the computers & docs at a couple dozen biolabs along the border. The specimens were already evacuated, distributed among the other hundreds of biolabs worldwide that my criminal "government" funds.
Patrick Armstrong early on I recall asked: never mind Kiev, it isn't even clear if Russia wants to take Kharkov.
What I find interesting in the discussion is that the comments seem to demonstrate the uncertainty surrounding Russian intent rather than resolve it.
Some argue Kyiv was a feint. Others argue it was a decapitation strike aimed at Zelensky and the government. Others suggest Russia hoped to take the city if it proved easier than expected. Those are different explanations, not confirmations of a single theory.
The article is strongest when it challenges the assumption that the war can be understood solely through the lens of Kyiv. The southern campaign clearly mattered and produced some of Russia's most significant early gains.
Where I become less convinced is when the argument moves from that observation to the much stronger claim that Kyiv was never a serious objective.
The operation against Hostomel, the advance from Belarus, the multiple axes converging on the capital, and the apparent expectation that the Ukrainian government might collapse all suggest Kyiv held significant importance in Russian planning. The presence of Rosgvardiya and riot-control units is difficult to reconcile with an expectation of a long war. It makes more sense if Moscow anticipated a rapid political collapse and a need to administer territory rather than fight for every street.
The southern campaign also deserves more nuance. Early Russian success there was not necessarily proof that it was always the primary objective. Local collaboration, sympathetic officials, shorter supply lines from Crimea, and different operational conditions all appear to have contributed. Success and priority are not necessarily the same thing.
What seems entirely plausible is that Moscow entered the war with multiple objectives. Secure strategic gains in the south, pressure the government in Kyiv, encourage political collapse, and fix Ukrainian forces around the capital. Those aims are not mutually exclusive.
The strongest claim in the article is not that Russian forces fixed Ukrainian troops around Kyiv. That clearly happened. The strongest claim is that fixing them was the primary purpose of the operation from the outset.
That remains possible.
I am not sure the available evidence allows us to be that certain.
gosh, if you only knew how disgusting the word "Kyiv" sounds for Russian (and also actually for Ukrainian, because Ukrainians are just crazed Russians) ear. It´s like the worst kind of village dialect/ modern slang you can imagine for your native language. "Lindin", "Parir", "New Urk" or something like that :))
I am not surprised Kyiv sounds strange to Russians, but then Kiev looks and sounds wrong to Ukrainians, because the city of Kyiv is Ukrainian not Russian.
The fact is, Chicken Kyiv does not support your argument!
Uh, no, Kiev is a Russian and Russian-speaking city. Before 2014, it was spoken by 8 out of 10 residents.
That was Putin's greatest miscalculation, assuming Russian-speaking Ukrainians saw themselves as Russian. And, in many cases, the Russian invasion of the Donbas and Crimea ended whatever sympathy for Russia may previously have existed.
Before 2014, language was often far less politically significant than outsiders assumed. Millions of Ukrainians spoke Russian while still considering themselves Ukrainian. The events of 2014 forced many people to choose between linguistic identity and national identity. Many chose Ukraine.
If language determines identity, then Russia has spent years killing Russian speakers. By that logic, this is not liberation. It is fratricide.
You're welcome to deflect if it blunts the sting of embarrassment, my comment was to alert other readers that you are too biased to even get basic facts straight and, as such, your other commentary should be disregarded wholesale. Perhaps you find it edgy to point out that this is a brother war, but it just further illustrates how disconnected you are from how people on the ground in both of these countries view the situation.
"Some argue Kyiv was a feint. Others argue it was a decapitation strike aimed at Zelensky and the government. "
Both? Likely a feint, likely with stretch goals, some of which weren't achieved.
I'll add that "decapitation strike" is a US/Israel preoccupation, so idea that was a goal may be pure projection.
They never had enough forces around to take even the east bank of Kiev.
On the west bank:
2000 paratroopers to take an airport (and surroundings) that the Russians would never use due to the amount of anti-air defenses they'd have to get through to land planes (The paratroopers got in due to surprise). The Ukrainians were so worried about those that they'd essentially turned them into a zoo exhibit, then agreed to let them go since it wasn't worth the manpower to keep them.
A number of troops to keep the crossing at Chernobyl secured (that is how those paratroopers got out).
No ground forces of any significant size massing to support any march on west bank Kiev.
The east bank
Numbers vary a bit but if you average them ~30 000 ground forces.
Ukraine didn't take the 3 day deadline seriously due to the, compared to the target, tiny force. This can be seen by Ukraine not even bothering to even prep the bridges in and around Kiev and taking potshots at anything in the stretch of road they turned into a shooting gallery instead of taking out the few engineering units stuck.
30 000 ground forces is not enough to occupy Kiev, that would take at least 60 000 let alone take and occupy the place in 3 days. Ukraine as defenders had at least a 3:1 advantage in manpower while bunkering down in the most defended area in Ukraine. Just for that and the 3 day deadline Russia would have had to formally declare war so that Russia could send conscripts across the border to get the manpower needed. Which would be around 500 000 ground troops just for Kiev and another 250 000 as screen and pinning force for the rest of the Ukrainian army. Or more then what Russia had available even if you include conscripts without shutting down bases and pulling from the navy & air force.
But it doesn't matter since most civilians (including me at that time) do not know what it takes to take a city like Kiev and saw impressive photos and movies of Russian vehicles just waiting to be blown up. Ukraine and NATO kept up the charade since it was, and still is, a massive morale booster. Plus admitting that your enemy isn't the brain dead incompetent you've been portraying them as isn't conductive for your career when everyone around you is ideologically committed to OTHERING them.
Did the Russians get what they wanted?
Oh no. The goal was to get at least to the outskirts of Kiev so they could make threatening noises with artillery.
That would at least have prevented the successful intervention by Johnson.
Just to put everything perspective.
What Russia did in the south was a blitzkrieg action. The second time ever a blitzkrieg against a, nominally, peer level army succeeded (Well up to the point that Johnson came in and told Ukraine they were wimps for setting up peace talks with Russia). The diversion that was the march on Kiev was the key to that.
The RUF did not send a force large enough to take metropolitan Kiev and then secure it. The main attack was aimed toward Melitipol and then Mariupol.
If the Ukies had abandoned Kiev to the Russians, the Russians would have had to choose whether to hold a salient into Northwestern Ukraine. They might well have had to pull forces from the effort to secure strategically important Crimea, and put them into a kettle conveniently close to NATO forces.
If the Ukies had abandoned Kiev to the Russians, the Russians likely would have abandoned it too.
"If the Ukies had abandoned Kiev to the Russians, the Russians likely would have abandoned it too."
----------
Yup.
Can't do it all, press forward everywhere to test then support the most vital and/or most successful fronts. Fall back and dress the lines for defense elsewhere (Kherson?), ground is patient and can be re captured later, your men are harder to replace.
Only so many troops were available in 2022, this isn't 1943 when Stalin could keep an apparently endless supply of men moving towards the front, refilling ranks faster than Germans could empty them.
For a start, demographic transition has come & gone so military age young men are at a premium. Also, these guys have more options than in the USSR, they can now "vote with their feet". Hence NOT using draftees outside Russian Federation in the Ukraine war and the unprecedented pay scale offered to volunteers.
Modern soldiers take too long and too many resources to train and equip for the kind of wars we fight now vs. the bad old days when mobilizing a non specialist draftee might cost the USSR a month to 6 weeks basic training (or less on a bad day), a uniform (sleep in your greatcoat, no sleeping bags issued!) and issuing a cheap-ish Mosin rifle or the world's cheapest submachine gun.
"this isn't 1943 when Stalin could keep an apparently endless supply of men moving towards the front, refilling ranks faster than Germans could empty them." - this is also a usual part of Western narrative. USSR had no "endless supply of men" and at this stage of war it was already more German soldiers killed than Soviet troops (in the first stage of the war the numbers were reverced. Don´t forget that the most of all 27 millions dead soviet people in WWII are actual civilians, not soldoers. This kind of numbers are rather typical when the nice and very human civilized Westerners wage their wars
I've looked at the wartime non recoverable casualty figures which are all massive but somewhat contradictory. In total, it seems the USSR never reached 1:1 with the Axis in such casualties, if you consider all the POWs dead in captivity, it gets even grimmer.
And yes, the civilians had the worst of it throughout.
The intent of the SMO was to force the Banderan Kapo Zelenski, to negotiate. If Russia did end up taking Kiev, that would have been hilarious. Then Russia would have to withdraw or find another 200,000 soldiers to help secure the metropolitan area and the supply lines.
About 40,000 men were used to charge toward Kiev. The metropolitan area was around 5 million. All of it needed to be secured. Not possible.
It was obvious the concentration was on Melitipol and Mariupol.
I believe Kherson was a diversionary attack that turned into actually taking Kherson city.
DC taken War of 1812. War continued.
Pyongyang taken Korean War. War continued.
Kabul taken Forever War. War continued.
Taking Kiev would not have been decisive.
Yes. Neither Kiev nor Kharkov were expectd to be taken and I think you are right Kherson city happened by accident (and was abandoned in a hurry).
Great to read you again, Mike. It is my understanding that there was a large Ukrainian force about to attack in Donetsk and the Russian advance stopped this attack. It also forced the Ukrainians to reallocate forces back to Kiev. Is this correct?
Hope all is well!
It is correct. The Banderan army had increased shelling and was marshalling forces to advance on Donetsk city.
Indeed.
The irony is that Zelensky ordered Zaluzhnyi to defend Kiev at all costs - drawing troops away from the south, yet in 2024 when Zelensky fired Zaluzhnyi the public reason was that he allowed the Russians to occupy the south. It has been obvious for a long time that the advance on Kiev was a fixing operation however, to admit this would crumple the Western narrative we offer of the Russians as being bumbling military buffoons.
Just like those "bumbling buffoons" who destroyed 70% of the Wehrmacht during the 2nd World War. Why give those "stupid Slavs" their due?
What if the aim of the military operation in Kiev was not the capture of the city, but the capture of Zelensky and the Ukronazi junta? For that, Russia would not have needed the same amount of troops as necessary to seize the whole capital.
With such a "decapitation strike" (if you pass me the term), the war could have ended much sooner and with much less bloodbath. After all, I remember reading an article a few years ago (by Simplicius the Thinker, I believe) according to which Russian special forces were only a few kilometres away from Bankova Street, but could not get any farther due to strong Ukrainian resistance.
This is too much NATO workflow. The Russian goal, at least visible in the agreement that was ready to sign, was not a failed state. So removing the leaders and maybe sentencing them to whatever in a show trial is not the Russian style. And who was intended to sign for the Ukrainian side the Istanbul treaty?
But then why venturing that close to Bankova if the aim was just to pin the UAF in Kiev?
I am not saying that diverting the UAF from Donbass was not the main aim, but that Russia may have also attempted to snatch Zelensky as a secondary goal, in order to shorten the war, if the attempt had been successful.
Why should this shorten the war? Some other political leaders from parliament, military or administration would step in. Selensky is a bad politician and diplomat. If some of the die-hard nationalists took over, then the negotiation process could be complicated. And the goals of the SMO are not to gain territory, but, up to this day, the removal of the nationalist elements, neutrality, reduction of the armed forces.
Well... it would be stupid for Russia to let someone from the die-hard nationalists take over from Zelensky once removed! Not sure why they would allow it to happen.
A good point.
If the intent was to capture the Banderan Kapo Zelenski, the RUF would have used helicopters to get to his location. I don't think that was the plan.
Capturing ZNPP should be considered as an achievement.
"objective analysis requires separating assumptions from evidence".... proceeds to write an entire article based on his assumptions.
Russian didn't have anything to counter drones when the conflict started, they should have expected them because they had encountered in Syria.
IMO Russia's mistake was not having initiated a SMO to control Kiev immediately after the 2014 coup (if not before that) prior to the Nato-West's massive military buildup of forces & defenses, in order to remove the usurpers and restore the democratically-elected government, just as the Russian integration of Crimea was enabled by thwarting the Ukrainian junta's invasion of Crimea. Undoubtedly Russian Intelligence knew what was going on and heard Nuland's "F___ the EU" phone call, but Putin failed to act decisively (except to preserve the Sevastopol base) and the result is a terrible tragedy with protracted conflict. [Armchair General here.]
1. it would have had to be huge, not sure Russia could have done it then (or now)
2. Nato was a lot lot stronger then and Russia a lot weaker. The risk of a direct war with Nato would have been large. The guiding principle of Russia's invovlement in Ukraine seems to have been to avoid direct confrontation with Nato until they were ready.
From 2020 onwards it has been Nato avoiding direct confrontation with Russia.
Hell, the Ukrainian army already collapsed, leading to the original Minsk Accord, then collapsed again, leading to Minsk-2.
NATO didn't do jack and was not in a position to do so.
but nor was Russia. And be clear nato was a lot lot more unified and stronger in 2014 than it was in 2022 while Russia was much much weaker.
Even now Russia hasn't tried to hold any territory where it doesn't have 75%+ local support. Just how many oblasts do you think Russia would have taken? Even now there is no credible alternative to run Ukraine come peace. Was there an alternative back in 2014? That is why Putin is a great president, he thinks these things through.
I'd say quite the opposite. Note how NATO didn't do jack about Georgia in 2008, nor did they charge in Ukraine in 2014. Hell, NATO is a lot more unified now than in 2022. In 2022, NATO hesitated to send a few crate of old Soviet-era stockpiles. Today, NATO munitions hit Russia and Russian ships are seized, all with total impunity.
Mostly, I see excuses for Russian indecision. Note that NATO didn't worry about popular support. You just do things and the population will always side with whoever is stronger, more ruthless and more brutal.
Human nature is like that of dogs that way.
????? About what in Georgia. They (or specifically USA) created the crisis in Georgia, and then Russia walked back out of Georgia.
Nato is unified more than in 2022? I don't think so.
I see patience. I see avoidance of nukes in a world that is going the way of China and Russia so rapidly that there really is no need to act.
The US created the crisis in Georgia but NATO did not intervene. Contrast with Ukraine a few years later, where NATO most assuredly intervened, and even today, anyone in europe who expresses an expectation for anything other than Total Victory is treated like he just farted in church.
Russian indecision and dithering simply invites escalation. It also invites excuses for failure.
Nato did not try to intervene in Crimea and Ukraine was not a Nato member, so I don't think the alliance was prepared or mandated to fight Russia. Russia knows about every nook and cranny in Kiev, and Ukraine's military was disorganized in 2014 (remember Debaltsevo) so a covert operation with backup forces would have been sufficient.
Well that is confident of you.
Certainly Ukraine was very weak - largely because their best officers and men were innately pro-Russian and quit to joine the rebels. But still Debaltsevo suggests to me that whoever was calling the shots for Ukraine had no clue about Soviet warfare tactics.
But the question in 2014 was not whether Nato would risk fighting Russia but whethe Russia would risk fighting Nato - and it seems to me that Putin was right to not risk it.
Had he tried it could not have been an SMO, it would have had to be a proper invasion - certainly to the Dnieper + Kiev. 3 million men? 4?
Not only was Ukraine's military in disarray, but also the government that was created by the seat of Vicky's pants. A covert operation could have taken the latter down, with backup forces to deal with any resistance. Much like Maduro in Venezuela.
No one was threatened by the Ukrainan government or military. After all the rebels defeated it twice and Kiev needed France and Germany to bail them out at Minsk twice.
But back up forces? Again how many million troops? 3?
Incidentally Venezuela is entirely independent - all rump has there is a single rerpresentative - essentially an ambassador.
The idea that VZ represents some devastating attack by the evil Trump giving him some kind of control is a pure Trumpian fiction. He wants us to believe he is a real nasty MF. That is what US is nowadays. Shout loud because it is carrying only a small stick.
Yes, you're right it is much more complicated than I assumed.
Venezuela is now a US puppet. Much like Ukraine.
Think you have it right about securing the Crimea.
A feint to faint over for the experts in 20 years.
Good commentary. I knew most of this from other commentators but this added more color.
You open e4. What is your second move? Obviously - it depends. If you only know how to act on e5 but not on d5 - may be you shouldn't play chess at all.
Well, chess is limited to 64 fields and few figures. War offers much, much more options. The Russians opened with Kiev (and several other moves at the same time). As in chess, the enemy has a saying too, in war. Obviously, the generals had prepared a lot of contingency plans - bearing in mind the political order.
The Kiev opening had a lot of tasks. Strategically - bring Ukraine to the table, tell NATO we mean business. Operationally - feint, fixing operation, well if Kiev falls (3% expectation rate) take key positions, otherwise causing chaos, cutting Kiev from the West. Tactically - Nuclear (Chernobyl was taken, few days ago Zelensky had told the Munich security conference he intends to build the bomb - some material could have been around), Biolabs - several where taken, Aviation - Gostomel is and was the hub of Antonov, producer and operator of An-124 and An-225, which are and where used for NATO - via SALIS etc. (taking parts, tools, documentation for the Russian An-124, destroying NATO assets).
After all these tasks of the opening where fulfilled, it was time to retreat, because the logistics was extremely vulnerable (one road passing through the Pripyet swamps) and the forces close to NATO. Short NATO logistics, Long Russian logistics. These forces would have been cut off and destroyed. Putting this retreat in relation to the agreement and calling it a good-will-act is another maskirovka.
Concise and well-reasoned. Hard to argue with the analysis.
Yes but Perhaps the Russian commanders hoped to capture Kiev if they could do so easily even if it was not the main objective.
they couldn´t do that easily. Why are you saying that? The forces were absolutely unsufficient
Ask your favorite ai about operation Danube, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20–21, 1968 -- the essential point being that the ukr bombed the runways at the airport, forcing the supply planes which were already en-route to return to base. Whoever ordered these strikes on Hostomel ensured that even if the ukr natl guard would have fallen to the attack helicopters, the rus move would have been checkmated right then and there.
(i don't know to much about what other airports could have been used to land the heavy Il-76 transport planes; i only know that 'they had to give up and return home.)
As I recall Russia bombed almost all the other airports - suggesting there was neither a massive resupplying intended not a massive evacuation plan if it went wrong
are you actually imagining that russian planes were over kiev that day? .. i remember the stories about the helicopter attack, them holding the airport for a bit before getting routed .. which meant 'they lost' -- which is why i remember it so vividly, has always bothered me that people could not look beyond the stuck convoy then; and even that stuck convoy was a kind of a loss.
so.. it was a kind of fixing operation, but it wasnt the ukr but rus that had gotten (itself) fixed there. still a valiant effort, but lets stick with reality please. it won't take you long to find the details about the op.
Sorry - sent misiles, not bombed.
No Hostomol is exactly how you would plan a fixing operation - especially if the real goal was to shore up Donbas. West of Kiev is perfect - and they all got out.
You bought the story Russia was selling.
Recall in Soviet or WW2 East warfare, getting defeated means losing all the blood and treasure, it does not mean chasing them away with few casualties on either side. Getting "routed" is meaningless except in US terminology where PR is the only thing that matters and to hell with HR.
The stuck convoy - did it take losses? Not that I ever saw confirmed.