Ukrainian "Mirage" or Mirage??? [i]
A new wonder weapon again... or just "mirage"...
Mirage airplanes are the pride of the French aviation industry and, for decades, have been used as a backbone of their air force and navy. Their slow but steady “retirement” started with the introduction of the Rafale. Mirage series were successfully exported to friendly countries, but the worldwide sales always lagged behind the much wider distribution of the US F-16 airplanes. Mirage 2000-5F, which is the designation of the new Ukrainian multirole combat aircraft, came as a second Western-made airplane after the donation of the F-16s from NATO partners. What can be taken as a positive is that Ukrainian Mirages will come directly from the French stocks, which are different from the F-16s that came from a ”third party.” It is always that second place that must be annoying for the French…
Before diving into a new weapon intended to “change the course of the war” for the nth time so far (remember Leopard 2, Challenger, HIMARS, ATACMS, F16s…), let’s define the term “mirage”:
Mirage means something that is believed to be true or real, but is actually false or unreal.
In its extended sense, Mirage applies to an illusory vision, dream, hope, or aim.
The definitions mentioned above are from the Merriam-Webster dictionary. Do the words describe the real state of the Ukrainian hope to change the course of the (lost) war, or just a delaying tactic to show false support and unity of their so-called Western allies that are more than willing to fight Russians to the last Ukrainians???
This article may be read with two previous articles addressing F-16 use in Ukraine. The links are:
![Ukrainian F-16 Saga [i]](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_140,h_140,c_fill,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep,g_auto/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb0efc38a-d245-457a-80e8-709b990d5a8c_1200x650.jpeg)
![Ukrainian F-16 Saga Continues [i]](https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_140,h_140,c_fill,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep,g_auto/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4ce48c1c-6e83-41f8-907b-1d014492d975_671x443.jpeg)
The Airplane
This article discusses the particular model that will serve Ukraine. The Bibliography section lists several references for the reader interested in Mirage's history.
Ukraine will receive Mirage 2000-5F aircraft from the French Air and Space Force. These aircraft were modernized from Mirage 2000Cs produced between 1982-1986 so the airframes are definitely not the new ones.
The history of the Mirage 2000-5F project started in 1993 when Dassault began pressuring the French government to place a contract for the new model which the company planned to upgrade from existing Mirage 2000C models. Dassault lacked large-scale export orders, and securing a government order would not only provide necessary funding but also serve as advertising for the aircraft.
In the business world, lobbyists work with the military brass shoulder-to-shoulder, so after some negotiations, the French MoD allocated funding for the modernization of 37 Mirage 2000C to the Mirage 2000-5F level, which was supposed to be a temporary solution before the arrival of the new Rafale fighter.
The major Mirage 2000-5 upgrade is the Thales TV/CT CLDP laser designator pod and the Thomson-CSF RDY (radar Doppler multitarget) with look-down/shoot-down capability. With this, the airplane achieved air-to-ground, air-to-air, and air-to-sea capabilities. An essential ability for the Ukrainian battlefield is air-to-ground mode: the RDY has navigation and attack functions that give it deep-strike and close-support capabilities. According to the developers, the radar can automatically lock and track multiple targets (up to 24); the radar can detect low-flying targets (60 m), which is particularly interesting in intercepting cruise missiles and drones. Technically, it can also engage Russian Su-25s and helicopters, but that will be extremely risky because they are operating in the proximity of the frontlines.
This radar allows the aircraft to use up to six MICA missiles that can be fired simultaneously. Improvement also includes an ergonomic cockpit with a multi-display night-vision compatible glass cockpit and dual-linked wide-angle HUD and HOTAS controls.
The ICMS Mk2 countermeasures suite with Samir DDM missile warning system, which contains three radar detectors and an infrared sensor linked to active jammers and chaff/flare dispensers, provides additional protection. ICMS 2 incorporates a receiver and associated signal processing system mounted in the nose capable of detecting hostile missile-command data links. It can also be interfaced with a new programmable mission-planning and post-mission analysis ground system. It sounds good in the advertising brochures and the company briefings and is likely effective against the older generations of the enemy AA and SAM missiles, but how that will work against a peer opponent armed, for example, with R-37 AA missiles, is questionable.
The powerplant is a single SAFRAN M53-P2 turbofan engine, producing up to 21,400 lb of thrust with an afterburner. The maximum operational speed is 2.2 M and the ceiling is ~16,800 m. The operational range with internal fuel tanks is about 1,000 km. It can also carry oversized drop tanks developed for the nuclear-capable bomber Mirage 2000N, increasing the range to 2,000 km. Theoretically, this will enable planes to take off from Western Ukraine bases and execute low-level flights to the front lines and back.
The weapons can be mounted on nine hardpoints, giving it flexibility in mission profiles ranging from air superiority to ground attack.
Previously mentioned MICA-guided missiles come in two versions: radar homing (ARH) and infrared versions. Compared to the US missiles and similar Soviet/Russian missiles, there are advantages and disadvantages. They are developed as a modular platform, not as explicitly designed for one particular seeker. The range is also smaller compared to AIM-120, Meteor, or R-77. It is not even comparable with the R-37 in range and speed. It also is costly. They may work against Gerans and Kh-101s, but they don’t stand a chance against the Russian interceptors.
The real use will be with cruise missiles and guided bombs such as SCALP/Storm Shadows, and AASM guided bombs.
What does it bring to the battlefield?
According to the media, citing French officials and Ukrainian demands, Ukraine has requested 12 Mirage 2000-5Fs to meet the immediate needs of the Air Force. This number is pretty much the size of one squadron.
There were rumors that France would provide Ukraine with 12-20 airplanes as part of its military assistance. French media published that the training of Ukrainians on the Mirage 2000-5F lasted six months.
The first batch will be delivered in the first quarter of 2025 and will consist of three aircraft. Not an impressive number...
Greece also operates Mirages, but there is almost no chance they will deliver anything. Because of its relationships with Russia, UAE is highly likely not to participate in this, and Taiwan, as a user, is also eying available second-hand airplanes. So, in summary, only those in current French use may be delivered but in a minimal number.
In addition to attempting to show that France stands with Ukraine and is delivering more modern airplanes compared to the older F-16A (which are more of a third-hand than second-hand type), it will be for a considerable time just in the shadow of the proven ex-Soviet fleet and newly acquired F-16s.
Initially, its primary role will be to engage drones and cruise missiles. With the Link 16 system, the Mirage will be able to exchange data in real time, transmit coordinates to each other, and achieve a high level of interaction among themselves and with the F-16. For this role, even an average pilot may be capable of engaging and achieving some success. The price of weaponry will be very high, but financing is, for now, not a big problem for Ukraine simply because donors will open their storage for the missile surplus stocks. Although the French requirement of six months of training is necessary for familiarization, the pilots are already trained on the Western platforms, and that is not an unreasonable time to acquire basic skills. However, these skills are not even close to the requirements for engaging the planes against peer opponents or executing missions at the front and in the Russian rear. Years of training and hundreds of flying hours in real conditions are necessary for that. As time passes, Ukrainian pilots will gain these skills, but Ukraine needs fully capable combat planes now. Retired French pilots (mercenaries) will likely operate them for now.
In the offensive role, the primary task is launching standoff strikes with long-range weapons, particularly Storm Shadow / SCALP cruise missiles. The Exocet anti-ship missile in a new configuration can hit ground targets. In addition, the aircraft can attack the Russian radars using the AS37 Armat anti-radiation missiles.
Mirage 2000-5F can execute tactical missions such as launching standoff glide bombs like the AASM Hammer. Integration of other types of bombs, such as JDAM-ER and the SDB, is also highly likely.
It is unlikely that Mirage will be used as an air superiority fighter simply because it will never be available in sufficient numbers to withstand the onslaught by Russian interceptors. So this option is, in normal circumstances, out of the question.
Ukraine must find young pilots with basic military flying skills and devote time to polishing their skills on the new Western planes. This will take several years, and by then, Ukraine will have already been defeated.
The Mirage 2000-5F is a very good airplane and fits very well into the French and NATO concepts, but the conditions in Ukraine are far different from the NATO norms. Let's assess the Mirage in the field, far from the French maintenance depots and beyond the cover of NATO: the first is basic operations such as taking off and landing. The Mirage's design demands runways of at least 7-800 m, and this requirement limits the use to just half of the military airfields. The runways are concrete but Ukrainian runways are of different quality compared to the Western ones. They are rugged and fit perfectly into the Soviet operation modes, meaning that even when damaged and covered with snow and water puddles, they can still serve Soviet-built airplanes. The Western airplanes require pristine runways. The F-16 with an air intake close to the ground is particularly demanding simply because small stones, debris, branches, or even leaves can be sucked into the intake and damage or destroy the engine. The Mirage has side air intakes, meaning they are more resilient, but the landing gear is "softer" compared to the Soviet build, and even a tiny pothole or obstacle can damage it. All in all, cleaning the operational airfield requires constant work. If Russians inflict even slight damage, repairs will take hours or days. The MiG-29 or Su-27 can take off without issue, but the Western "silks" must stay in hardened shelters until the runways are cleaned.
Last but not least is the maintenance: Ukraine faces a shortage of trained personnel to maintain even the remaining Soviet-built aircraft. Skilled technicians and maintenance experts for Mirages are limited to France and Greece, the only two NATO countries operating Mirages. On the contrary, the F-16 operates in 9 European NATO countries, and the pool of skilled pilots and technicians is much higher. Ukrainian technicians can be trained to do basic maintenance, but anything complicated requires foreign assistance, and if the engine needs repair, it must be shipped to France. Electronics as well. Foreign supervisors (retired or even active technicians from France and Greece) may be available on a contract basis. These contractors are ever-present, but they are pricey. For the sake of numbers, one contract technician can make 12-15K Euros tax-free per month, much higher than the current military paychecks or pensions. This is attractive, but it is risky because Russians will attack sooner or later. Language barriers may be a problem. Manuals are in French and/or English, but one thing is to speak ordinary street English or French, and the other is to have proficiency in technical language skills. Ukrainians already have a problem with sufficient English skills, and the French language creates even more problems. Of course, there are translators and translation services, but all of them require time.
All of this is complicated enough, but one thing is even more important: Russians. Russian intelligence will sooner or later pinpoint Mirage locations, and it is not a question of if but rather when Iskanders, Kinzhals, or even Lancets can turn the French pride into burning metal scraps.
Mirages in wars
Mirage's war participation has always been against inferior opponents. For example, in serious activities during the 90s, Mirages participated in the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia as well as against Bosnian Serbs. On August 30, 1995, during one of the NATO bombing missions, Sergeant Aleksandar Studen from the Bosnian Serb army (who later joined the Yugoslav military and served in the legendary 3rd Neva battalion) locked onto the low-flying Mirage 2000N with his 9K38 Igla MANPAD. He launched a missile that struck the middle of the plane, and both pilots ejected.
In his own words:
"At 16:00, a low and middle altitude strike started, targeting Koran barracks, Famos factory, Jahorinski Potok storage and transmitter at Mount Ravna. In one of the first overflies, an F-18 hit the transmitter from an altitude of around 1,200 m and pulled out, heading toward my position. I had wrongly estimated and launched the missile at a distance of 5,000 m. The missile was correctly guided to the target. But there was no hit. The target did not enter my launching zone. Bombing continued at 17:05.
‘Two Mirage 2000s approached at 1,500 m altitude. After setting the parameters, I chose one of them and launched the missile. It was guided correctly to the target. The missile managed to overtake the Mirage and hit in the middle. Previously, this aircraft had dropped four bombs that hit the Famos factory. The aircraft caught fire, and both pilots ejected. The Mirage crashed some eight kilometers from Pale."
It was a Mirage 2000NK-2, belonging to 3/2 EC, coded 3-JA, No. 346, with callsign EBRO 33. Two-member crew: Jose Souvignet and Frederic Chiffot were captured by an armed villager who took them to the nearest VRS (Army of Republika Srpska) unit and later to a military hospital in Sokolac.
The video of the downed Mirage is here:
All attempts by NATO to locate them were unsuccessful. They were later returned to the French defense minister in a well-publicized event. This action showed that Mirages are very sensitive to MANPADS, so during the 1999 NATO aggression, they didn't fly less than 4 km except on a few occasions. Several times, they were fired upon. There is no physical evidence of damage, but there are some rumors.
During the NATO war in Afghanistan, a French Mirage 2000D crashed about 100 km west of Farah. Both crew members successfully ejected. The reason may be technical because, at that time, the Taliban had just a handful of Strela 2 and old CIA-delivered Stingers, which were remnants from the Soviet-Afghan war.
In the war in Yemen, the UAE lost a Mirage 2000D on 14 March 2016 after it crashed in Aden. UAE Mirages attacked Al Qaeda positions in the early morning. The coalition claimed the Mirage crashed due to a technical issue, but reports from the site claimed that Mirage was shot down with Strela 2 while flying low. Both pilots perished. In any case, these kinds of contradictory reports are common.
Taiwan's Air Force lost a Mirage 2000 5F during routine operation. The plane lost thrust in its engine before crashing into the sea off Hsinchu on 11 September 2024.
How Russian AD can deal with Mirages?
Mirage 200-5F is not a stealth airplane, and Russian radar can detect it without a problem. Finding the right and verified scattering diagrams is difficult, but the "delta" wing configuration from other aircraft can be used as a base and modified with the equations.
RCS for typical fire control radars at 3cm wavelength may look similar to the following:
Professor Sukharevsky, in his book on RCS scattering, created diagrams for the delta wing configuration of EF2000:
To some degree, EF2000 can be used as a model because of the delta wing, but in reality, RCS will be different. The scope of this article does not discuss the specific details or perform proper electromagnetic analysis. Still, the reader can be assured that metric surveillance radars and centimetric fire control radars can detect, track, and lock onto the Mirage in any configuration.
Mirages were lost due to the inferior enemy MANPADS or technical issues, and now we can imagine what may happen in Ukraine against a peer opponent. For example, let’s discuss when a low-level flying Ukrainian Mirage tries to perform a pop-up bombing. In that maneuver, the pilot approaches from a low altitude in level flight to avoid Russian radar and, upon cues from the computer, pulls up at the last moment to release the bomb. Release usually occurs between 20° and 75° above the horizontal. At that moment, he can be engaged with SHORADS and MANPADS if he is in the vicinity of the frontline or with medium-range weapons if he is far behind. There is also a constant danger of the Russian Su-35 and MiG-31 Fighters. It is almost inconceivable that the Ukrainian Mirages will fly at medium or high altitudes. Hence, the only relatively safe profile is a low-level approach and launch of cruise missiles at 100+ km from the frontline or, if using guided bombs, at least 20 km from the front line.
The bottom line is that far behind the front line, Mirages may fly at medium altitudes, searching for drones and cruise missiles with their look-down/shoot-down capable radars. However, much more challenging bombing missions are simply too risky for altitudes more than 500 m. Engaging slow-flying drones without any danger from the opponent should be a routine task but not without risks. In several instances, celebrated Ukrainian pilots tried to shoot down drones just to be forced to eject because debris from these same drones damaged the chasing fighter, and the pilot was forced to eject.
What can also be a problem is the plane’s own air defense. Synchronization between the ground AD units, especially those armed with SHORADS and MANPADS, must be very precise. Otherwise, some trigger-happy shooters without contacts from the upper command can fire at anything that flies within range. Announcing in advance the flypaths can be risky on its own because Russian intelligence may find out and somewhere within R-37 or R-77 Su-35s or MiG-31 may wait for their moment.
Conclusion
There are no wonder weapons the Western allies can send to Ukraine in any meaningful number that can change the inevitable defeat. Mirages, like many previously sent wonder weapons, are just drops that will never overfill the glass simply because the glass is broken and leaking, and it will eventually run dry. These wonder weapons are just entertainment for charlatans. Any serious analysis can prove that. Everything is just a game in which Ukraine is suffering to an enormous extent. A few Mirages will change nothing.
[i] Edited by Piquet (EditPiquet@gmail.com).
Bibliography & Further Readings
DCS Mirage 2000C Guide
DCS M-2000C Flight Manual EN
Delta wing aerodynamics
Mirage 2000 (Philippe Roman, Alain Crosnier)
Mirage 2000-5 Mk.2 (Biblioteka Magazynu Lotnictwo Wojskowe № 7)
The Dassault Mirage 2000 B-C-D-N, Andy Evans
Marcel Dassault, 1955-1965 Les années “Mirage” (Collectif)
I.V. Balagansky: Damaging Effects of Weapons and Ammunition, Willey
Mirage! Dassault's Mach 2 Warriors, Philippe Duchateau Salvador, Mafe Huertas
Sky Fighters (Chevaliers du Ceil) movie
If you like the article (and many more articles regarding military subjects will come), you can buy me a coffee:
https://www.buymeacoffee.com/mmihajloviW
Great and very informative article.
If I were Russian, I'd be attacking the ground support personnel who would be almost exclusively French. No support/maintenance = no fly fly!
Good analysis, thanks 😊