US vs Venezuela: a new Caribbean Crisis [i]
"Enforcing Democracy While Taking the Oil"
The U.S. and Venezuela are once again locked in confrontation, raising fears of a new Caribbean crisis. American officials have been blunt about their desire for political change in Caracas. Critics say this is less about democracy and more about Venezuela’s vast oil reserves.
The phrase "intensified counternarcotics campaign," as used in U.S. public statements regarding Venezuela, functions as a formal framing device that masks broader strategic objectives. While ostensibly focused on disrupting drug trafficking networks, the initiative also serves as a mechanism for exerting political pressure and signaling U.S. influence in the region. This approach contrasts sharply with the Russian concept of a “special military operation” in Ukraine. Russian operations are officially justified as measures to protect Russian-speaking populations and to counter perceived threats from NATO expansion and the government in Kiev, which Moscow portrays as ideologically hostile and illegitimate. In contrast, U.S. objectives in the Venezuelan context are less about protecting local populations and more about achieving regime change, gaining control over national resources, and reasserting influence in a region considered part of its strategic sphere of interest. The counternarcotics narrative, while publicly defensible and legally framed, effectively provides a pretext for projecting power and advancing political and economic objectives, including the disruption of smuggling networks and the consolidation of influence over key state assets.
The force buildup
The United States has already squeezed Venezuela with sanctions, partially isolated it diplomatically, and recognized opposition figures as legitimate leaders. Now, military moves in the Caribbean suggest that Washington is keeping more forceful options on the table.
In recent weeks, the United States has carried out its largest naval buildup in the southern Caribbean since the Panama operation of 1989, placing considerable pressure on Venezuela. According to open sources, multiple Arleigh Burke–class destroyers, including the USS Gravely, USS Jason Dunham, and USS Sampson, have been deployed alongside the guided-missile cruiser USS Lake Erie and the fast-attack submarine USS Newport News. Amphibious assault ships such as the USS Iwo Jima, USS Fort Lauderdale, and USS San Antonio are also operating in the area, each carrying elements of a Marine Expeditionary Unit with roughly 2,200 personnel. Reports suggest a total of eight warships and at least one submarine are active in the region, marking a substantial U.S. naval presence.
The situation escalated sharply when the U.S. military conducted an airstrike on September 2 against a boat alleged to be part of the Venezuelan trafficking network, allegedly killing 11 people. The strike represented one of the rare instances of direct U.S. military action in the Western Hemisphere in recent decades. While the administration has argued that the operation falls within the president’s authority to defend national security, critics in Congress have raised questions about legality and the expansion of executive power.
Tensions have risen further after reports of Venezuelan military aircraft flying near U.S. destroyers in international waters, which the Pentagon described as “highly provocative.”
In response, President Trump warned that Venezuelan jets would be shot down if they threatened American ships. Soon afterward, the U.S. bolstered its regional posture by deploying ten F-35 fighters to Puerto Rico, thereby increasing its ability to conduct precision strikes or protect naval forces.
The U.S. Secretary of War, addressing the Marines aboard the USS Iwo Jima, stressed the urgency of their counter-narcotics mission: “It’s not if, it’s when,” conveying that their deployment is imminent—not optional.
On the Venezuelan side, President Nicolás Maduro denounced the deployments as a direct military threat aimed at regime change. In one of his interviews, he mentioned that "85% of the billions of dollars annually from international drug trafficking is in the U.S. banking system”.
As a countermeasure to the US forces’ buildup, President Maduro declared a state of maximum readiness, called for the mobilization of militias, and pledged to defend national sovereignty, even describing the country as prepared to become a “republic in arms.” According to reports, Venezuela has increased troop levels in sensitive coastal areas from 10,000 to 25,000, partly to counter trafficking but also to demonstrate resolve against U.S. pressure.
The buildup thus represents a complex mix of so-called counternarcotics operations, deterrence signaling, and strategic confrontation. For Washington, the deployment serves as both a military posture against organized crime and a political message to Caracas. For Venezuela, it is seen as proof of U.S. intentions to undermine its sovereignty. The open question is whether this naval presence will remain a demonstration of force or evolve into a more sustained campaign with wider regional consequences. In any case, time will tell…
Venezuelan assets
Historically, Venezuela’s military development has been shaped by both external and internal pressures. The country’s extensive petroleum reserves and geographic position in the northern part of South America have made it a focal point for regional geopolitics. Military modernization efforts have aimed to create a credible deterrent capable of responding to potential incursions, as well as to project domestic political authority. The reliance on integrated air-defense systems, forward-positioned air bases, and a network of coastal and riverine installations reflects lessons learned from regional conflicts and global military trends, particularly the emphasis on layered defense and force dispersion to mitigate vulnerabilities.
Geographically, Venezuela presents unique challenges and opportunities for defense planning. The extensive northern coastline requires robust naval and coastal defense assets to monitor maritime approaches, while the interior’s river systems necessitate the maintenance of riverine units capable of operating in difficult terrain. Urban centers, industrial facilities, and energy infrastructure are concentrated in specific regions, which in turn dictates the prioritization of air-defense coverage and rapid reaction forces. The interplay between geographic factors and military deployment underscores the adaptive nature of Venezuela’s defense planning, which aims to balance territorial breadth with operational effectiveness.
Venezuela’s approach to national defense also reflects broader political objectives. The distribution of military installations and the integration of militias serve not only strategic purposes but also reinforce the government's political authority. By positioning key military assets near political and economic centers, the state maintains the capacity to respond to both internal unrest and external pressures. This intertwining of military and political considerations is evident in the maintenance of strategically important airfields near Caracas, the deployment of forces to guard the oil belt in the south, and the presence of militia units across the border regions.
In conclusion, Venezuela’s military infrastructure presents a multifaceted network of installations, forces, and defensive systems that collectively aim to safeguard national sovereignty, protect critical infrastructure, and ensure internal political stability. The integration of air, naval, and ground forces with local militias, combined with a layered air defense network, provides both strategic depth and operational flexibility. While variations in readiness and technological capability pose challenges, the overall structure reflects an enduring effort to maintain credible territorial defense, deterrence, and resilience in the face of regional and domestic challenges. By analyzing the distribution of bases, force composition, and defensive patterns, one gains a comprehensive understanding of Venezuela’s military posture, its strategic priorities, and the interaction between geography, politics, and doctrine in shaping national defense.
Venezuela’s military is far weaker compared to the US military assets. Its navy is small, and its forces are riddled with corruption and politicization.
The country’s armed forces comprise multiple branches, including the Air Force, Navy, Army, National Guard, and local militia units, each with distinct operational responsibilities that reflect historical, geographic, and strategic considerations. The dispersion of military installations across the national territory enables the government to exert control over key regions while maintaining a credible defensive posture in both the interior and along coastal areas. Understanding the distribution and function of these installations provides insight into the broader strategic and doctrinal approaches of the Venezuelan state.
In 2008, the Venezuelan Air Force was officially renamed the Bolivarian Military Aviation of Venezuela (Aviación Militar Bolivariana de Venezuela). The most valuable assets are Russian-made Su-30MK2 jets. There are 21 available, but the question is how many of them are operable at any given time. On paper, there are also 16 US-made F-16 A/B out of which just a handful are operational (as of the time of writing, 3-5). The Venezuelan Air Force maintains a series of strategically placed air bases designed to ensure coverage of the entire national airspace while supporting both defensive and offensive operations in theory. The El Libertador Air Base, situated near Maracay in the central region, serves as the primary hub for Venezuelan military aviation. It hosts command centers, training units, and fighter aircraft, acting as the central node for operational coordination. Its proximity to Caracas is both symbolic and practical, providing rapid access to the capital in the event of internal or external crises. This base is historically significant, reflecting the centralization of Venezuelan air power in the years following the consolidation of military doctrine in the late twentieth century, particularly during periods of heightened domestic political tension.
In addition to central installations, Venezuela has forward-positioned air bases that extend operational reach and allow for rapid deployment to maritime and border regions. La Orchila, an island base located off the northern Caribbean coast, is primarily intended for naval surveillance and serves as a forward operating location for fighter aircraft. Its offshore position allows for coverage over adjacent waters and acts as a strategic buffer, providing redundancy for central air operations while enhancing situational awareness in key maritime approaches. In the northwest, the Punto Fijo Airfield supports operations in the Falcón region and along the western coast, facilitating regional air patrols, logistical movements, and rapid response to potential threats emanating from both domestic and international sources. Similarly, the Barcelona or El Tigre Airfield in the east safeguards critical energy and industrial infrastructure, reflecting the strategic prioritization of the Orinoco Oil Belt and associated refineries. La Carlota Airfield, located in Caracas, primarily serves administrative and political functions. While smaller in scale, its significance lies in its role as a hub for VIP transport, governmental continuity, and occasional limited fighter operations, highlighting the intertwining of military and political considerations in Venezuelan defense planning.
The Navy is tasked with protecting Venezuela’s extensive northern coastline and asserting control over its principal ports and navigable rivers. Puerto Cabello serves as the central naval hub, housing the primary fleet, which comprises patrol vessels, frigates, and logistics ships. This base serves as both a maintenance and training center, ensuring that the fleet remains operationally capable while providing strategic reach along the Caribbean littoral. La Guaira, situated near the capital, complements this by supporting smaller vessels, facilitating coastal surveillance, and serving as a training site for personnel. Western bases, such as the one at Punto Fijo, extend coverage into the Gulf of Venezuela and are geared toward coastal defense and the protection of resource-rich areas. Riverine installations in the Orinoco Basin further demonstrate the Navy’s attention to inland waterways. These outposts, though smaller, play a crucial role in rapid deployment, logistical support, and patrolling areas inaccessible to conventional seagoing vessels. The combination of coastal and riverine assets enables Venezuela to exert influence over both maritime and internal waterways, a necessity given the country's geographic challenges posed by its rivers, wetlands, and coastal features.
The Army and National Guard form the backbone of territorial defense, with brigades, artillery units, and mechanized forces strategically distributed across central, eastern, western, and southern sectors. Central units near Maracay offer rapid response capabilities to threats within the interior and coordinate with air-defense installations. Southern forces, particularly in the Guayana region, focus on safeguarding natural resources, industrial installations, and critical transport corridors. Border units in the west and east monitor international boundaries and contribute to internal security, reflecting ongoing concerns about illegal cross-border activity, including smuggling and the trafficking of contraband. The positioning of Army and National Guard elements also serves a dual purpose: deterring external aggression while maintaining a presence that can be mobilized quickly to support civilian authorities during internal crises, ranging from natural disasters to political unrest.
Complementing the conventional forces are militia units, which provide local defense and augment the capabilities of the regular military. These units are widely dispersed, often stationed near towns, villages, and strategic border regions. Their primary roles include local surveillance, coastal monitoring, and internal security operations. The militia structure allows Venezuela to maintain an expanded defensive footprint without requiring a permanent deployment of regular units in every locality. This decentralized approach enhances flexibility, enabling the armed forces to prioritize strategic points while leveraging local populations for intelligence gathering, rapid response, and deterrence of small-scale incursions.
Air Defense - the First Potential Target
Venezuela’s air-defense architecture is built as a multi-layered network intended to shield critical urban centers, military installations, and strategic economic assets. However, the country’s vast territory makes comprehensive coverage impossible. This geographic limitation creates exploitable gaps in the system, which U.S. forces and, to a lesser extent, regional actors in neighboring states can use to their advantage.
Venezuela’s long-range air defense is anchored by S-300VM (export version Antey 2500), which provides strategic coverage for major cities, air bases, and critical infrastructure, particularly oil refineries and industrial hubs. The country is believed to operate two battalions of these systems.
Supplementing this layer are Buk-M2E medium-range systems, deployed to protect regional approaches and to close the gaps left by the S-300VM network. Venezuela is reported to field three battalions, comprising 12 Buk-M2E launchers with associated equipment and a stock of approximately 250 missiles.
The short-range tier is represented by the S-125M (Pechora-2M) system. Though based on legacy technology, these upgraded systems remain a key component of Venezuela’s layered defense, particularly for shielding secondary targets and reinforcing zones not fully covered by longer-range assets.
For point defense, Venezuela relies heavily on ZU-23-2 autocannons and Igla-S man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). These weapons provide close-in protection against low-flying aircraft, helicopters, and drones, and are typically positioned around high-value installations such as air bases, command centers, and industrial facilities.
In addition to the modernized Russian and Chinese systems deployed across Venezuela, several legacy air-defense platforms remain in the inventory, though their operational effectiveness is highly questionable. Among these are the Israeli-made Barak-1 SAM and Bofors AAA units, both of which are widely believed to be non-operational.
The Barak-1 system, once intended to provide short-range, point-defense coverage, has suffered from a lack of maintenance and spare parts, compounded by the cessation of direct Israeli support. Similarly, the Bofors AAA, a relic of earlier procurement programs, has likely degraded beyond practical use.
Overall, the operational obsolescence of systems such as the Barak-1 and Bofors AAA underscores the need for either a complete modernization program or a strategic reorientation toward maintaining a smaller but reliable and well-supported defensive architecture. Without such measures, portions of the country remain effectively unprotected, thereby reducing the credibility of Venezuela’s broader air defense strategy.
The integration of permanent bases, forward airfields, riverine outposts, and militia units establishes a comprehensive territorial defense network, enabling Venezuela to exert control across its diverse geographic landscape. The dispersion of forces across central, eastern, western, and southern sectors ensures coverage of strategic points while enabling flexibility in response to localized contingencies. Although variations in operational readiness and technological sophistication exist, the distribution of forces reflects an attempt to balance territorial coverage with the protection of politically and economically vital assets. The presence of both regular and irregular forces, combined with layered air-defense systems, underscores a defensive philosophy that prioritizes the protection of sovereignty, deterrence of external intervention, and preservation of internal stability.
Striking back - What Venezuela can do against the US
Venezuela maintains a multi-layered anti-ship and coastal defense network, combining legacy naval platforms, modern aircraft-launched missiles, and shore-based systems. Central to this network are Peykaap-class fast attack craft, equipped with Nasr anti-ship missiles, an Iranian copy of the Chinese C-704. Each vessel carries two launch tubes, with the missiles employing autonomous terminal guidance that combines TV-homing with millimeter-wave radar. The export variant, the CM-90, has an operational range of approximately 90 kilometers. Combat use of the Nasr-1 has been recorded in regional conflicts, including Hezbollah’s strike on the Beit Lid military base in northern Israel in October 2024.
A shorter-range counterpart, the Khowsar missile (Chinese C-701), shares launch infrastructure with the Nasr-1 and has previously been employed in the 2006 attack on INS Hanit (503). Despite their combat history, neither missile type has been reported in use by Houthi forces in Yemen, highlighting their current regional deployment limitations.
While Nasr-1/CM-90 missiles are theoretically a threat, their effectiveness against modern U.S. Navy vessels is limited. Arleigh Burke-class Aegis destroyers, such as USS Jason Dunham (DDG-109), feature layered defensive systems including the ESSM (Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile) and Phalanx CIWS, capable of countering both medium- and close-range missile threats. Furthermore, naval commanders can often neutralize Peykaaps before they approach launch range, reducing the strategic risk.
Venezuela’s Su-30MK2V Flanker fighters provide a more credible anti-ship capability. Each of these aircraft, part of a batch of 24 delivered by Russia in 2008, can carry Kh-31A (AS-17 Krypton) missiles with a maximum range of 100 kilometers, exceeding the Nasr-1’s reach. These aircraft-based missiles can engage targets far beyond the coastal strip and are likely Venezuela’s primary anti-access weapon in a maritime conflict scenario.
Along the Caribbean littoral, Venezuela’s coastal defense systems integrate radar surveillance, missile batteries, and artillery, creating a defensive belt to safeguard major ports, urban centers, and strategic maritime approaches. The combination of shore-based defenses and mobile missile platforms complicates adversary operations within Venezuelan coastal waters.
Nevertheless, operational limitations remain. Many legacy systems, including Israeli-made Barak-1 missiles and Bofors AAA units, are reportedly non-operational. The air-defense network itself suffers from gaps in coverage, maintenance shortfalls, and limited integration of UAVs and other surveillance assets. These deficiencies, combined with potential internal political fractures and the presence of anti-government elements within the military, reduce the overall effectiveness of Venezuela’s maritime deterrent.
In summary, while Venezuela possesses a layered maritime and anti-ship defense capability with modern missiles and aircraft, its overall readiness is constrained by operational and institutional challenges. Modern U.S. or regional naval forces would likely encounter resistance but could mitigate threats through layered defensive systems and preemptive engagement strategies. Venezuela’s true strength lies in its ability to combine aircraft, Peykaaps, and coastal batteries in coordinated strikes—a capability limited by logistics, training, and internal vulnerabilities.
The US Assessment: Venezuela as a Low-Hanging Fruit
According to strongly critical external assessments such as those from the Miami Strategic Intelligence Institute, Venezuela’s air defense network is in a state of severe degradation. More than 60 percent of the radar fleet is reportedly non-operational, creating wide gaps that drug-trafficking networks exploit with relative impunity. Over half of the JYL-1 and JY-11B radar systems are reportedly out of service due to a lack of spare parts and sustained technical neglect. Combat aviation faces similar constraints, with operational readiness limited across the fleet.
Critics further argue that organized crime has penetrated the Venezuelan military command structure. The so-called Cartel of the Suns is alleged to exert influence over radar operations, manipulating shutdown schedules to facilitate illicit flights. The 2019 crash of aircraft YV3217, which killed the wife and daughter of a senior commander, together with multiple defections from the Air Force, has been cited as evidence of internal fractures, factionalism, and the deep politicization of the air defense apparatus.
External assistance, while present, has been selective and politically oriented. China has reduced direct technical support, supplying spare parts only through civilian intermediaries. Since 2020, Iran has assumed a more active role, providing Mohajer-6 drones, electronic warfare specialists, and surveillance systems. However, these contributions have been confined mainly to reinforcing the defensive perimeter around Caracas and La Orchila, without addressing the broader collapse of national coverage.
The persistence of clandestine flights further illustrates the erosion of institutional control. Aircraft departing Venezuela continue to land on unauthorized runways in Mexico, often with the tacit collaboration or tolerance of local authorities. This has created a Venezuela–Mexico air corridor that functions as a primary cocaine transit route to North America, according to reporting from the DEA, the U.S. State Department, and UNODC.
On the technological front, Venezuela is reported to operate both the Mohajer-2 (locally dubbed Harpy) and Mohajer-6 unmanned systems. These platforms are deployed primarily in Caracas, Maracaibo, and La Orchila. While the Mohajer-6 is technically capable of strike missions, its operational use has been restricted to reconnaissance and internal propaganda purposes. The fleet suffers from low availability, and crucially, it is not integrated into Venezuela’s national air-defense network, leaving regions such as Zulia and Apure exposed.
Taken together, this critical perspective depicts Venezuela’s air-defense apparatus as compromised by political capture, corruption, and criminal penetration. Foreign assistance has reinforced regime enclaves but has not restored nationwide capability. As a result, the country remains vulnerable to airspace violations, narcotics trafficking flows, and potential external military pressure. Analysts from this school of thought assign the system a capability rating of 2/10, concluding that only a comprehensive institutional overhaul and a fundamental strategic redesign could reorient national defense away from regime survival and toward the protection of sovereignty.
The U.S. Naval Strike Capacity
The United States Navy’s long-range land-attack capability rests heavily on the Tomahawk cruise missile, a weapon system that has been in continuous service since the 1980s. While the missile has evolved through multiple blocks, the broader question is no longer about capability per se but about capacity. With a total stockpile in the range of 3,500 serviceable missiles, the United States faces a situation in which its vertical launch system (VLS) tubes may outnumber available weapons. In effect, the Navy is approaching a paradox in which it risks running out of missiles before it runs out of launchers.
Tomahawk Block II was retired years ago, and Block III rounds have been phased out more recently. The active inventory is now composed of Block IV Tactical Tomahawks, produced from 2004 onward, and Block V missiles, which are upgraded Block IVs that have passed through recertification and modernization lines since 2021. Between FY 2004 and FY 2020, the Department of Defense purchased approximately 3,882 Block IV Tomahawks. Combat expenditure since 2004, primarily in campaigns after 2011, accounts for just under 400 launches. Factoring in foreign orders—Raytheon reported delivering its 4,000th missile in 2017, some of which went to the United Kingdom—the likely U.S. stockpile today stands at approximately 3,500 Block IV and Block V rounds. This figure is large but finite, revealing structural constraints that have operational consequences.
The U.S. Navy’s current battle force fields 73 Arleigh Burke–class guided-missile destroyers, a shrinking number of Ticonderoga-class cruisers (13 as of the mid-2020s, with accelerated retirements underway), four converted Ohio-class guided-missile submarines (SSGNs), and nearly 50 nuclear attack submarines, many of which carry VLS tubes. In theory, a cruiser or destroyer could dedicate dozens of its cells to Tomahawks. Submarines bring additional capacity: the four SSGNs alone can carry up to 154 missiles each, while VLS-equipped attack submarines can field about a dozen apiece. If every ship in the fleet were loaded with its maximum Tomahawk allocation, the requirement would approach 4,000 rounds—roughly 500 more than the current estimated stockpile.
In practice, of course, not every ship is operational at the same time, not every VLS cell is allocated to land-attack, and submarines must carry a mixed load of torpedoes, strike weapons, and other payloads. Yet the arithmetic highlights the underlying issue: the Navy’s inventory has been sized not to support multiple reloads or campaign-level attrition, but to fill a single set of magazines across the fleet. That policy decision dates back to the post–Cold War drawdown in the 1990s, when at-sea VLS reloading capability was eliminated. The rationale then was straightforward: if the Navy only procured enough missiles to fill the fleet once, there was no value in sustaining the costly infrastructure to reload ships in theater.
This approach may have been sustainable in an era of permissive operations and limited regional strikes. Still, it is increasingly problematic in a world where high-end conflict against peer adversaries is contemplated. A modern campaign in the Western Pacific, for instance, would consume Tomahawks at a rate far higher than historical averages. A salvo of a few hundred missiles in the opening days of conflict is entirely plausible. Without the ability to regenerate magazines forward, ships would either be forced to cycle back to distant depots or continue operating with depleted strike capacity. The result is that the strike power of the surface fleet could decline sharply within the first weeks of combat.
The production base further complicates the picture. Since 2021, most new “production” has consisted of Block IV recertification into Block V, extending service life and adding new capabilities such as maritime strike. While there have been contracts for new Block V all-up rounds, the scale is modest, designed to sustain a warm production line rather than surge capacity. This raises legitimate questions about whether the United States retains the ability to rapidly manufacture large numbers of new Tomahawks in the event of war. The answer is technically yes—Raytheon has preserved the line—but the industrial base is sized for incremental modernization, not emergency replenishment.
Taken together, these factors suggest a vulnerability in U.S. naval strike doctrine. The fleet possesses more launchers than it can fully arm with Tomahawks, lacks the infrastructure to reload VLS tubes at sea, and relies on a limited production base that is optimized for upgrades rather than expansion. While the missile remains reliable, flexible, and combat-proven, it represents a finite resource that could be quickly drawn down in a major war.
For policymakers and defense planners, the implications are clear. First, magazine depth must be considered a critical element of deterrence. A strike capacity that cannot be regenerated risks encouraging adversaries to assume the United States will exhaust its precision long-range fires early in a campaign. Second, future force planning must address the retirement of the Ohio SSGNs, which provide significant Tomahawk capacity but are scheduled to leave service this decade. The Virginia Block V submarines will restore some of this firepower through the Virginia Payload Module, but at a smaller scale. Third, the Navy must decide whether to reinvest in some form of forward or at-sea reloading capability. Without it, the mismatch between launcher availability and missile supply will persist.
Ultimately, the Tomahawk case underscores a broader truth about modern naval warfare: striking power is not only a function of technology but also of inventory management, logistics, and industrial base resilience. The United States Navy remains unmatched in its ability to project power from the sea; however, its dependence on a finite stock of Tomahawks raises difficult questions about how sustainable that advantage will be in a prolonged, high-intensity conflict.
For all its tough talk, Washington faces limits. Its stockpile of cruise missiles is smaller than many assume, meaning any strike campaign would have to be carefully managed. At-sea resupply has long been abandoned, so the U.S. can’t simply reload warships in the middle of an operation.
US Navy “Combat Load” against Venezuela
Based on publicly available information about U.S. Navy ships and their typical Tomahawk loadouts, we can produce a reasoned estimate of cruise missile availability for the naval forces reportedly positioned near Venezuela. This assessment is entirely open-source and analytical, avoiding operational instructions.
According to the latest reports, the U.S. naval presence in the Caribbean likely comprises a combination of surface combatants, amphibious ships, and possibly one or more fast-attack submarines. Key platforms capable of launching Tomahawks include Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, Ticonderoga-class cruisers, and Ohio-class SSGNs.
Surface Combatants: Arleigh Burke-class destroyers have 90 to 96 vertical launch system (VLS) cells. Ticonderoga-class cruisers have 122 to 128 cells. These cells are multipurpose, but for strike-focused missions, a conservative open-source estimate is that roughly 20–40 Tomahawks per ship would be assigned, reflecting realistic peacetime loadouts and operational allocations for air defense. If the current deployment includes, for example, five destroyers and two cruisers, this yields approximately:
Destroyers: 5 ships × 30 missiles average = 150 Tomahawks
Cruisers: 2 ships × 35 missiles average = 70 Tomahawks
Total from surface combatants: roughly 220 Tomahawks.
Submarines: At present, open-source reporting confirms the presence of at least one fast-attack submarine (SSN) in the operational area. While the deployment of an Ohio-class SSGN remains speculative, the possibility cannot be entirely discounted. Given the platform’s inherent clandestine capabilities and extended operational reach, it is plausible that an SSGN could be positioned within striking distance somewhere in the Atlantic, providing the U.S. Navy with a significant covert precision-strike option. The uncertainty surrounding such deployments underscores the strategic ambiguity often leveraged in naval operations to enhance deterrence and operational flexibility, particularly in regions of heightened geopolitical tension.
Ohio-class SSGNs are equipped with 154 missile tubes each and can carry Tomahawks in all tubes. If one SSGN is in the area, it could theoretically carry up to 154 Tomahawks. Fast-attack submarines (SSNs) carry fewer missiles, typically 12–28, but for a conservative estimate, one SSN could contribute approximately 20 missiles.
Total from submarines: 154 + 20 = 174 Tomahawks.
Aggregate Estimate: Combining surface combatants and submarines provides an upper-bound estimate of approximately 394 Tomahawks in the current naval group. This number assumes ships are predominantly loaded for strike missions, which is rarely the case in practice, as VLS cells are shared with air defense and other missile types.
It is also important to note that amphibious ships, while part of the overall naval group, are generally not Tomahawk platforms, so their contribution to this estimate is negligible. Additionally, operational doctrine favors retaining some missiles in reserve to account for attrition or extended operations, so the effective number available for immediate strike would likely be lower.
The Attack
Speculation regarding potential U.S. military options against Venezuela frequently includes references to the use of long-range precision strike capabilities in combination with internal destabilization efforts. In public discourse, some analysts have suggested that Washington could employ a significant portion of its naval-based cruise missile arsenal to target key Venezuelan military installations, including air bases hosting fighter aircraft such as F-16s and Su-30s, as well as advanced air defense systems such as the S-300VM. These scenarios are often linked to the notion of “hybrid” or indirect approaches, drawing comparisons to tactics associated with Israeli operations in the Middle East. In such accounts, non-state actors, opposition elements, or proxy forces, including Colombian groups with drone warfare experience, are theorized as potential instruments for weakening Venezuela’s integrated air-defense network.
Corruption and entrenched anti-government elements create fertile ground for engagement by any first-strike adversary. Within Venezuela, the fifth column, comprising politically disloyal officers, defectors, and actors embedded in military and security institutions, represents a latent vulnerability that cannot be dismissed. Such internal fractures exacerbate the operational deficiencies of the air-defense network, as critical systems, including radars and fighter units, may be sabotaged, neglected, or exploited to facilitate illicit operations. This internal vulnerability exacerbates the regime’s reliance on politically loyal enclaves around Caracas and La Orchila, further limiting adequate coverage nationwide. Consequently, Venezuela’s air-defense posture is not solely defined by technological assets or foreign-supplied systems. Still, it is critically undermined by human factors, making the country particularly susceptible to both internal subversion and external coercion.
Within this line of speculation, drone technology is frequently emphasized as a tool for both sabotage and targeted strikes against political or military leadership, to induce strategic paralysis or leadership decapitation. The subsequent use of conventional cruise missiles is then described as a follow-on mechanism to neutralize launchers, aircraft on the ground, ammunition storage, and even Venezuela’s small but symbolically significant naval capabilities. While these discussions remain hypothetical, they illustrate how narratives of regime change and external intervention often blend conventional strike concepts with irregular and covert elements.
Such scenarios, however, must be evaluated with caution. From a legal and political standpoint, they raise serious concerns under international law regarding sovereignty and the prohibition on the use of force. Strategically, they also carry the risk of rapid escalation, miscalculation, and unintended regional destabilization. For these reasons, although frequently discussed in open-source commentary, the practical feasibility and legitimacy of such approaches remain highly contested.
Conclusion
In reality, the issue has never been about democracy, human rights, or national prosperity for the Venezuelan people. The true motivation lies in controlling the country’s natural resources and projecting strategic influence in the region. Claims of combating drug smuggling or protecting U.S. citizens serve primarily as pretexts, particularly because narratives like a weapons-of-mass-destruction hoax would be ineffective against Venezuela. In fact, a substantial volume of narcotics enters the United States through military bases worldwide, with many covert operations and black-ops initiatives embedded within these frameworks. The primary objective is therefore to remove Maduro and his government by any means necessary and to gain complete control over Venezuela’s vast natural wealth, with little regard for the welfare of its population.
However, any U.S. attempt to force regime change carries significant risks. It could trigger widespread chaos across Latin America, including massive refugee flows, destabilization by armed groups, and potential intervention by great-power rivals. While Venezuela could be militarily overpowered, the political, humanitarian, and regional costs of such an operation would likely be profound and potentially catastrophic.
After Venezuela, the next likely target for external pressure or regime-change efforts would be Cuba, given its longstanding defiance of U.S. policy, strategic alignment with rival powers, and symbolic role as the last bastion of resistance in the Caribbean.
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[i] Edited by Piquet (EditPiquet@gmail.com)
Very good reading. Thank you!
Sir.. A question.. Any way the Venezuelans can try the Houthis asymmetric strategy? Not a choke point for sure but I think a low cost drumming drone air raids expending those not so cheap sm-6's?
And, sure not a fan of any frankly despicable people, but this to me too smells of reek desperation to cheaply acquire collateral to prop up the NY financial western system... Drugs war my a..., it's all about gold and oil... as most of the times...