War analysis

Kherson withdrawal and its implications

Introduction

First of all, I want to state, that in this article, I will focus solely on the facts regarding the withdrawal from Kherson. All other information and facts will be held back for the next major article regarding Phase 3 of the war.

Russia started with an unexpected, but yet, reasonable, move, to withdraw its forces from the West Bank of the Dnieper River. This of course, rose plenty of questions what the reasons, and more important, what the implications will be. I decided to write a quick analysis of the situation, since these questions currently move many people.

The path to the withdrawal

Even though the following states may sound a little harsh, I need to state them as well. Kherson City had three purposes at the beginning of this war:

1. Secure a strategic bridgehead for further advances to the North and West.

2. Buffering off the roads to Crimea and Nova Kakhovka, for Crimea’s water supply.

3. Creating the base for a referendum for the incorporation of the Kherson oblast into the Russian federation.

As we know today, the Russian military strategy was dynamically created for several eventualities. The first escalation steps, where it would be anticipated that Russia would fight solely the Ukrainian army were burned through pretty quick. In case, this scenario would have materialized, Russia would have used the West Bank, to quickly advance to Odessa, as soon as the Ukrainian army had collapsed. Due to the total take over of Ukraine and its armed forces, and the full supply of everything needed by NATO, this scenario, as we know, didn’t materialize.

Instead, Russia found itself with a strategic bridgehead, all its troops and equipment and many newly join Russian civilians on the hostile side of a huge river. This situation turned out to be very unfavorable.

Challenges for holding the West Bank

Basics

Holding a bridgehead is a complex operation. Bridgeheads are not meant to be permanent but to fulfil a purpose. I stated the intended purposes above. Those who hold a bridgehead are in an unfavourable position, since they need to sustain it over one or few narrow passes. Yet, we are not talking about an operational bridgehead but a strategic one. There is much to win and even more to lose. The enemy will do whatever he can, to deprive you from this bridgehead, to deny you your strategic objectives. Hence, the enemy will throw as many resources as possible in this direction, to deny your strategic objectives. We remember. You win a war, by achieving strategic objectives, set by politics. The calculation by Ukraine is, if it denies the Russians to capture Odessa, it wins the war and Russia loses the war. Hence the allocation of a major part of the Ukrainian army, its resources and most important, its logistics infrastructure, to sustain the attack on Kherson.

Logistics

Russia has been ever since it took Kherson city in a logistical nightmare. Not because of sustaining its army. But because of sustaining all civilians and its basic needs across the river, even though all crossings where under constant shelling. Unless Russia didn’t decide, to push the buffer zone around the river crossings further, to create a safe distance from shelling, the suppling of civilian and military goods can’t be sustained. Yet, logistics is everything. The best and biggest army will defeat itself, without enemy fire, if it runs out of supply.

We are talking about some 120,000 civilians and maybe some 20,000 troops, that were on the West Bank on the high time. Decisions needed to be made. Push further north/west and expand the buffer zones or retreat.

I will continue to explanations about logistics later, in the chapter “The Decision”. You see, logistics is the most important factor in war. The single most important.

Troops

Russia has a certain number of soldiers committed to the battlefield for the time being. Even after the mobilization only the number increases. It is still a SMO. Not a declared war. Which means, that there won’t be automatically mobilization waves after waves, to adjust the needed number of troops on the battlefield, to replace casualties and to manoeuvre. No. For Russia, at least for now, it is a strategic challenge, to achieve the objectives, set by the politics, with a certain number of assigned troops.

Committing the troops on a battlefield, where you can’t achieve your objectives is a waste of these scarce resources. You need to commit your troops exactly on the strategic theatre, where you assign the highest probability, to achieve your political objectives, with the assigned number of troops. Obviously, it was not Kherson anymore, since the full NATO commitment.

Advancing from Kherson to Odessa or Krivoy Rog would mean the following:

• Sustaining a strategic offensive over a major river.

• Direct head on battles with massive enemy formations.

This would lead to countless dead Ukrainians. And even more families, that would hate Russia for at least three generations to come. Even though Russia is in the business of destroying the enemy army, it looks as well, to preserve as many people as possible and only to deprive the Ukrainians from the possibility to sustain this war and to simply collapse. Collapse is the magic word of this war and Phase 3. It is all about collapse.

If Ukraine and NATO set up all its infrastructure, logistics, equipment and people for the Kherson/Nikolayev/Odessa direction and Russia would fall for it, Russia would need to go with the head straight through the wall. Don’t get me wrong. This is exactly, what the Russian doctrine is created for. Deep breakthrough operations. But! Ukraine is not the enemy, NATO is. And NATO is using Ukraine as a socket puppet. To kill all Ukrainians, standing in its way, would be exactly what NATO wants and a Win-Win for NATO.

Of course, we mustn’t, still, forget the certain number of troops, allocated to this SMO. Russia can’t fight doctrinally in as SMO. Fighting doctrinally, with large formations means at the same time, large losses. A SMO can’t sustain large losses, since the losses can’t be replenished. In a doctrinal war, the loses would be filled up automatically, with units that are being trained in the rear from the beginning, only for the purpose of filling up formations with loses. Such a mechanism is currently NOT in place. It is still a SMO, however people scream not it is war and gloves are off. No. Gloves are NOT off. If gloves would be off, we would see pictures, no-one of us would like to see in our generation. Go and pray, that such an event will not occur, where we will need to see it. Nevertheless, there is, as explain in former articles, a possibility of 30%, that we will see it.

Civilians

I can’t write to much about civilians. Only, that it looks to me, that this time the withdrawal was planned for a certain time and was not dictated by the enemy. That’s why Russia had time to organize and execute an orderly withdrawal off all civilians from the West Bank. Due to the martial law, the local Russian military commander was able to order the forceful withdrawal of civilians. Whether this force was applied, to empty the territory, I truly don’t know. I heard even reports, that some civilians decided to stay in Kherson, which implies, that the force was not used.

Nevertheless, even though justified by military requirements, I feel sorry for the civilians. It was certainly decided, to withdraw from the West Bank, during the time of the referendum. Which tells me two things. Again, they are indeed justified, nevertheless still hard.

1. Civilians were left in the believing, that they and their property is safe. There are even such comments from Russian officials. Okay, maybe these officials didn’t know. It is a military secret. They voted freely under such circumstances. Well, it is correct, and must have been done, still it is not “nice”.

2. The date to withdraw was clear, from my point of view (it is MY assumption), already when the referendums were announced. The announcement was well placed, AFTER the Americans cast their votes. It is part of the Russian strategy, to help itself, by helping the Republicans to win the elections. Not, that the Republicans would be soft against Russia. No. But in any case, saner than Democrats.

Infrastructure

Russia is planning to defeat, or better à collapse the Ukrainian army in a not too far future. My personal guess is, that it could be over in the earliest in March 2023 and in the latest at the end of 2023. Provided, that no escalation into Phase 4 (see my analysis over Phase 2, for my specifications of the Phases), due to the entrance of third parties, will be triggered.

No matter, if you believe in that timeframe or not, I assume, that the Russian military command believes in a similar (I don’t have details, that’s why I say similar) time frame.

Which would make it totally irresponsible and even idiotic, to destroy more infrastructure and cities/towns then absolutely is needed. I think that Russia is sparring most of the critical infrastructure, that doesn’t help the Ukrainian army but would be extremely expensive, to rebuild, after the war. Since the end of the war is near, it would be pretty much idiotic, as already stated, to destroy everything and then build it back after a few months for Russian money.

Don’t get me wrong, critical infrastructure indeed needs to be destroyed, as long as it serves the goal off collapsing the Ukrainian army and reduce own losses to a minimum. But taking this into consideration, the list of targets will shrink. And this short list is of course a target list for the Russian army.

Cities, in this case Kherson city, should be totally spared off fighting. First of all, because of the civilians, most are Russian or Russian speaking. And then of course because of the city itself. It would be a shame to destroy historical Russian cities while trying to capture them. If Russia had decided, to fight for Kherson, there is a high probability, that the city would have been destroyed in the process.

The danger is still in place. I think there is a certain probability that Ukraine will place artillery in Kherson and fire on Russian targets on the Left Bank of the river. In this case, Russia would need to target the city again. This time only without civilians. We mustn’t forget this.

Advantages of holding the West Bank

I want to reiterate the three purposes, why Russia captured Kherson at the beginning off the war. And then I will give my explanations of their status:

1. Secure a strategic bridgehead for further advances to the North and West:

   The bridgehead was secured. Since the Ukrainian Army hadn’t collapse in Phase 2, a breakthrough from the south to Nikolayev and Odessa is no more feasible in the format of the SMO.

2. Buffering off the roads to Crimea and Nova Kakhovka, for Crimea’s water supply:

   It was achieved but now it will be rolled back. I don’t know yet, what consequences it will have for the Russian army and Russian cities on the Left Bank, if the Ukrainian army moves to the river. Nevertheless, I assume, that the Ukrainians will have very soon other problems, then concentrating its army and valuable artillery in the south, when the North starts to explode.

3. Creating the base for a referendum for the incorporation of the Kherson oblast into the Russian federation:

   Successfully and sustainably achieved.

The new boss, his plan and deception

I won’t write an assessment about General Surovikin nor about the topics mentioned above. Only about subjects, concerning the Kherson withdrawal.

I will offer an assumption here, which is derived from my own professional experience. It could be totally wrong, though. Before General Surovikin took over the overall command over the SMO, we had several responsible Generals in the theatre of combat. I assume, that several Generals wanted to claim the overall command. And to qualify itself, each General needed to present his vision of a strategy, to achieve the political objectives, assigned to the SMO.

What is currently happening is part, of a plan, which has to be completed in June or July already. It is now being gradually, step by step, implemented. The closure of the Southern front, the mobilization, the referendums, the attacks on the infrastructure and the drones. Of course, many more elements as well. General Surovikin qualified himself on the battlefield, to be allowed, to present his vision of a strategy to either President Putin himself or to General Shoigu. Have there be other applicants? I assume, yes. But this could have been a single show as well, what I described.

I assume, part of the plan of General Surovikin, where two milestones.

1. Building up of the whole supply chain of NATO and Ukraine in two general directions. To Kherson and to Donbass. Since Russia is able to strike, with missiles everywhere anytime, there is not much flexibility, to quickly change the established, concealed routes. I assume, that there is work of months and months from NATO, to establish a massive logistics, offensive and defensive capability in the South, to deny Russia its political objective, off creating Novorossiya. It is all void now. It was a trap. (Maybe not from the beginning, but at least since the creation of General Surovikin’s strategy, in June/July). It is void, now.

   A shift of all resources, supply chains etc. to the north is a task, that is very much impossible now. Since Russia escalated the usage of the drones, has launched plenty of new military satellites and increased its intelligence staff for surveillance, the window of opportunity for NATO, to manoeuvre unpunished around, is closed.

   Yes, Ukraine and NATO will try to do it. Pivoting troops to the North shouldn’t be the big deal. But as we learned at the beginning. Logistics is everything. Human meat won’t win the war. The logistics infrastructure needs to be shifted to… Where to? Do you know? I don’t. I know it will be in the North. At a single entrance point? At several entrance points? At the whole Belarus frontline simultaneously? Is Belarus only a deception for a steamroll operation from the Donbass? I don’t know. General Surovikin, General Shoigu and President Putin know. We will see.

2. The second milestone was, as already mentioned, the American election. It is slightly more beneficial to Russia, to have the Republicans in power, then the Democrats. Not because they are weaker. Of course not. Since they aren’t. I would even argue that they are stronger. No. They simply don’t seem to be willing to trigger World War 3 and thereby, to risk the extinction of humankind. Which is very reasonable. (I’m neither for one nor another party out of political reasons. I just favour here the Republicans out of considerations because I don’t want to see WW3.)

   General Surovikin announced the withdrawal two weeks ago. Most of us were blind. At least I was. But he did. And the final announcement was made after the Americans cast their vote.

SMO: Political and economic circumstances

We are still talking about a SMO. And it is indeed still a SMO. The SMO has sufficient forces, resources and equipment allocated to fulfil the political objectives. But not in a head-on battle. Which is not the goal at all. Yes, I’m sure, Russia won’t hesitate to kill the whole Ukrainian able-bodied population on the battlefield. If the Americans keeps sustaining the Ukrainian resistance, maybe this is, what eventually will materialize. But it is NOT the objective. The objective is to spare as many soldiers as possible. The conquered Ukraine will need to be incorporated back into the Russian sphere. Every additional killed Ukrainian is one more problem, that will express itself in hate for maybe three generations of Ukrainians. Yes, Russia plans long-term. No one assumes, that after the war everyone will love Russians in (middle and western Ukraine).

Russia keeps on functioning economically, nearly, as there is no war. Is say, nearly. It keeps on integrating itself in the new emerging world order. Not only integrating but building as a main actor. Had Russia chosen a full declaration of war and doctrinal warfare, it would need to stop most of its international trade relations and switch to wartime economy, to sustain a totally different dimension of logistics and troop accumulation, training and preparing of new and reserve formations in the rear.

That’s why I assume, that, even after the partial mobilization, the war will be conducted as a SMO, unless the General Staff comes up with an assessment, that the political objectives can’t be achieved any longer in the format of a SMO. And this should be avoided by any means. If Russia transform its economy to sustain a highly mobile and supplied, doctrinal Russian army, then I’m not sure what geopolitical implications this could bring. At least some mobilizations waves throughout Europe as well. This should NOT happen for many reasons.

For the time being, Russia will further on need to deal with scarce resources. Even though there is a political committee established, to support the war efforts, it is not the same as in WW2. It has very tight restrictions, to shield off the economy as much as affordable. The highest scarcity in resources is in the troops. The Generals can’t simply order large scale operations, where you need necessarily to calculate with a huge percentage of losses. For example, if you want to storm quickly a highly protected city with a 3:1 advantage (this is totally made up, since there are so many factors not considered) you can calculate with a casualty rate of 30%. This is impossible in the format of the SMO.

Outlook

I prefer always, when a situation changes dramatically, to take a few days or even weeks to get a clear picture. That’s why I will refrain from making huge predictions right now.

Nevertheless, there is one thing, in which I’m certainly sure. The Russian goal is to trigger a Ukrainian collapse, instead of killing the whole Ukrainian army, to the last Ukrainian. You are reading frequently, that Russia’s goal is to defeat the Ukrainian army, not to conquer or hold territory in the first place. Yes, that’s what I say as well. But you can defeat an army on several ways. Of course, one of the ways is, to kill all troops and reserves available. The other way is, to deprive the army and its command of everything it needs to be able to sustain the fight. Again, logistics is everything.

If Russia makes it, to deprive the Ukrainian army from everything it needs to sustain the fight, then it will fully collapse and Russia can simply drive through, to Lviv and conclude the SMO. This is the goal. I won’t make any predictions yet, how this collapse will be triggered. We need to wait and see.