Iran vs. Israel
Preliminary Observations
Introduction
I was in the midst of completing my latest strategic analysis on Ukraine (due for imminent release) when news broke of Iran’s retaliatory strike against Israel. Naturally, I paused my writing to monitor the unfolding events. While the strike was anticipated, its dynamics were particularly noteworthy.
As long-standing readers of BMA may recall, I consistently assert that the first credible analysis can only emerge 48 hours after the dust has settled. Therefore, this piece does not aim to analyze, but rather to share some initial reflections. We will explore the implications in greater detail in subsequent articles.
Resources
I strongly urge you, if you haven’t already, to consult the following article which provides my strategic perspective on the region and the potential for escalation:
What Transpired? In essence, here’s what occurred: On April 1, Israel targeted an Iranian consular office in Syria, adjacent to the Iranian embassy, resulting in the deaths of high-ranking Iranian military personnel, including a Quds Force general. This action is deeply troubling under international law standards. Iran promised a response, and the Americans have acknowledged that retaliation was to be expected. Initially, there were indications that the Americans and Iranians had agreed to avoid direct conflict during Iran’s retaliatory strike.
On April 13, Iran executed its retaliation, deploying multiple waves of Shaheed drones, numerous cruise missiles, and an assortment of ballistic missiles, including possibly hypersonic types. The assault was orchestrated such that swarms of drones entered Israeli air defense zones simultaneously with the arrival of cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. This tactic is designed to overburden air defenses with drones, thereby reducing the likelihood of successful interceptions of the more critical missiles. This strategy is not revolutionary. We frequently observe it in military engagements in Syria, Russia, and Ukraine, where despite high interception rates claimed by defense systems (e.g., 95%), the effectiveness is moot if key targets are destroyed. For instance, if a party launches 100 missiles at an airbase and 95 are intercepted, but the remaining five achieve their objective, then the attacking party has effectively succeeded. (Russia often suffers often in Crimea from high interception rates but still destroyed “key” assets).
At present, it is speculated that several airfields and possibly an intelligence station on the Golan Heights have sustained damage. The full extent and significance of these impacts are currently under discussion.
Implications
Iran has indicated that its retaliation is complete and will not proceed further unless Israel escalates the situation. While Israel has expressed intentions to retaliate, the U.S., under President Biden’s administration, is urging de-escalation and celebrating their purported 99% missile interception rate.
This episode illustrates to Israel that the U.S. may be unable to assist should a full-scale conflict with Iran erupt. More crucially, it demonstrates Iran's capability to severely impair Israel’s military effectiveness by targeting critical airfield infrastructure necessary for the operation of their advanced aircraft fleet.
Given the U.S.’s extensive commitments in East Asia and Ukraine, significant intervention in another major conflict could compromise its global standing, potentially encouraging other regions to assert their independence from Western influence. Israel now faces a strategic predicament, highlighted by the departure of Israel’s presidential aircraft, "Wings of Zion," from the country shortly after the attack.
What Lies Ahead?
The future remains uncertain. As detailed in my upcoming article, this escalation is part of a broader "World War" context, which will persist until a decisive Israeli territorial expansion or a significant military defeat for Israel occurs. Whether this incident will provoke further Israeli retaliation, activate new conflict fronts around Gaza and Lebanon, or lead to additional escalations remains to be seen. What is certain is, that it will be fought till the end of one party. And therefore, we are certainly going to see “any” kind of escalation “somewhere”.
For now, this piece is merely a collection of initial observations. I invite you to share your insights and perspectives in the comments below.
I am still very curious about the Russian ICBM test-launch Friday, from southern Russia, very near the borders of Iraq and Iran, visible from both of those countries, and at a time of high anxiety.
It seemed to me to be a signal to avoid nuclear weapons, because Russia would have to get involved.
Yesterday there were reports that Russia had advised the US, through non-confliction channels, that if the US attacked Iran, Russia would have to support Iran.
This would serve to clarify the equation for the US, from probably-bad-idea to certainly-bad-idea.
China is allied, but seeks to be the silent partner, not taking risk, except when it is absolutely necessary. China can certainly not let Russia fall, and should help Iran discretely to not-fall.
I presume China has made policy clear to Russia and Iran, and given broader, politely-veiled hints to the US.
I suspect that Japan has a really clear view of all this, won't tell, but should be watched for actions.
Whatever the UK, Boris or Rishi, says, should be viewed as perfidy, as usual.
This is imo the key: "Iran has indicated that its retaliation is complete and will not proceed further unless Israel escalates the situation"
It can be interpreted as "We know this will piss you off, but if you don't sit this one out, we will come after you for real".
I.e. the real target was not military, but to dent Israels self-perception / image. While at the same time increasing Iran's image.