Thank You, Aleks. This is much appreciated. With the massive strikes of personnel, supplies and munitions recently, and the strike against the deep command bunker in western Ukraine a month ago, I have been somewhat hopeful that a massive counteroffennsive is being prevented.
The US/NATO is gradually degrading internally, and in global prestige and in $US hegemony, which is what makes the military machine of the empire possible.
It is terrible to see the war grind on, the COVID control-narrative still pushing forward, and to consider the back-up plans for financial control of western populations with CBDC.
One question: Do You think/imagine that the double drone attempts on the Kremlin could change the current smo parameters? Or are them only a provocation to have the war "they" so disperately need?
Bravo, Aleks! I think you're correct: Russia is countering the alleged "offensive," by destroying the pre-positioned supplies (re: Pavlograd). Removing the munitions and equipment should add pause to those directing the Ukrainian forces. Should...
If the probing actions start by UAF-NATO, then I would not be surprised if Russia maneuvers in a feint, once again redirecting UAF battle plans, much like the motion towards Kiev last year. Once forces are committed, the third (fourth) iteration of the AUF will be dissolved. Horrible loss of lives, genetic brothers makes it more so.
Unconditional surrender or complete capitulation of Ukraine are the only two options of ending the SMO. Russia is a Civilization State, and has severed all ties with the "West," with economic ties growing within BRICS and the Global South.
Thanks for your post. It summarizes well many possible outcomes.
I suspect that the West has many cards under the sleeve, most of them for pure PR results. For instance, the explosion of a dirty bomb in a big Russian city (a bomb prepared well in advance of the SMO) or similar initiative. Nothing impossible if the West was able to flight drones from Eastern Russia to the Kremlin.
I understand the linear logic of the "ideal Ukrainian offensive" (a distraction maneuver) but I find it too simplistic. For 2 warriors fighting each other, a distraction maneuver may work very well, but for an army that conducts ISR 24/7 on several fronts and that it's planning new scenarios on the move, it's hard to surprise it. An offensive around Kharkov will arise suspicion on other sections of the front.
Also, I find it difficult that the Russians wouldn't counter-counterattack in some way or another, depending on the main counteroffensive direction.
I expect a hybrid initiative from the West, such as the dirty bomb, plus providing long rang missiles that would further damage the Kerch bridge and an international setback for Russia (such as a new Turkish president or Saudi MBS imposing limited sanctions to Russia), all at the same time, and then offering to set up peace talks, expecting that magically Russia will give up due to the PR setbacks.
You make a good case for the CO being in Artemovsk. I am not sure about the destruction of Wagner. They're flanked by Russian military and the place is already destroyed. They can retreat and bomb them all the way to Valhalla. NATO would get their PR win ("Look how weak Russia is. They've been fighting for this town for 11 months and we took it back in 2 week").
I would like to develop a little more your point about an "insertion offensive" towards Mariupol.
However, there is quite a distance between the line of contact (say, Ugledar) and Mariupol. The Russians may halt the Ukrainians advance in between.
Would there be another target for such "insertion offensive" by the Ukrainians, which is closer to the line of contact, and even better (politically speaking) than Mariupol for them?
I believe that yes -- Donetsk (the city, not the oblast).
I would like to know your thoughts about this. Thank you.
There's an opinion regarding Kharkov that NATO-Ukraine were actively provoked to start an offensive exactly there in order to draw them from other areas and wear them down. Also it might've affected attitudes in russian society towards partial mobilization which began shortly afterwards.
I have a feeling that something is missing. Of course, it is not possible to take it into account during the analysis. As incredible as it may seem, I would still take into account the greater involvement of NATO or "allies" in the conflict than the current one. The West has invested too much to afford any other option than victory or the conditions for the "Minsk Agreements 3" as a precondition for the destabilization and disintegration of Russia. I think that Russia will have to take a more active role in "responses" to the West than it currently does.
I find it impossible to empathize with people who would take up arms against Russia in defense of Drag Queen Story Hour and pediatric gender clinics. Would I have preferred that they didn't? Certainly, but they have, so that is irrelevant.
P.S. I believe the doctrine Russia employed in Kherson and Kharkov is called maneuver defense, not mobile defense, but I could be wrong.
I wonder about what's next? What happens after the last Ukrainian is down and out. I don't think there is any doubt that NATO is planning to expand into Finland, Georgia, Odessa or where ever they get the chance. Will Russia be willing to take on NATO directly to push them back to pre-expansion position?
I can imagine that a lot of Ukrainian soldiers are going AWOL. If it were me, I certainly would take my chances - in the end it doesn't who shoots you dead, but if there's even a slight hope of escaping.
The west does not want negotiations, that is true. And after the recent drone attack on the Kremlin, the possibilities for negotiations are smaller than ever.
It can be only hoped that the strikes in the rear will be enough to prevent any massive offensives. Ukraine/Nato has done a very good job in suppressing information from the results, in order to have the best chance of launching an attack (regardless of the odds and suppressing knowledge of odds, or available equipment) and have the best possible moral.
I also recall reading earlier this year that the actual Nato plan for an offensive was actually three separate waves. The first one was the mobilized cannon fodder wave to suppress or wear down the defense, second was supposed to be "legacy USSR" equipment and tanks, and the final wave the "best Nato trained" mechanized or mobile brigades, probably for PR and optics against least resistance. I don't know whether that's still part of the plan or not, but I'd guess that at this point they can't afford to separate Nato or legacy USSR troops or equipment. Throwing the "worst" troops first is probably a valid strategy, albeit disgusting.
Stoltenberg also recently advertised that Nato has delivered "98% of promised equipment" to Ukraine. Hopefully a large portion of that is already gone from rear area strikes, but it'll remain to be seen.
Thank You, Aleks. This is much appreciated. With the massive strikes of personnel, supplies and munitions recently, and the strike against the deep command bunker in western Ukraine a month ago, I have been somewhat hopeful that a massive counteroffennsive is being prevented.
The US/NATO is gradually degrading internally, and in global prestige and in $US hegemony, which is what makes the military machine of the empire possible.
It is terrible to see the war grind on, the COVID control-narrative still pushing forward, and to consider the back-up plans for financial control of western populations with CBDC.
Hello Sir... Brilliant analysis as usual.
One question: Do You think/imagine that the double drone attempts on the Kremlin could change the current smo parameters? Or are them only a provocation to have the war "they" so disperately need?
Bravo, Aleks! I think you're correct: Russia is countering the alleged "offensive," by destroying the pre-positioned supplies (re: Pavlograd). Removing the munitions and equipment should add pause to those directing the Ukrainian forces. Should...
If the probing actions start by UAF-NATO, then I would not be surprised if Russia maneuvers in a feint, once again redirecting UAF battle plans, much like the motion towards Kiev last year. Once forces are committed, the third (fourth) iteration of the AUF will be dissolved. Horrible loss of lives, genetic brothers makes it more so.
Unconditional surrender or complete capitulation of Ukraine are the only two options of ending the SMO. Russia is a Civilization State, and has severed all ties with the "West," with economic ties growing within BRICS and the Global South.
Thanks for your post. It summarizes well many possible outcomes.
I suspect that the West has many cards under the sleeve, most of them for pure PR results. For instance, the explosion of a dirty bomb in a big Russian city (a bomb prepared well in advance of the SMO) or similar initiative. Nothing impossible if the West was able to flight drones from Eastern Russia to the Kremlin.
I understand the linear logic of the "ideal Ukrainian offensive" (a distraction maneuver) but I find it too simplistic. For 2 warriors fighting each other, a distraction maneuver may work very well, but for an army that conducts ISR 24/7 on several fronts and that it's planning new scenarios on the move, it's hard to surprise it. An offensive around Kharkov will arise suspicion on other sections of the front.
Also, I find it difficult that the Russians wouldn't counter-counterattack in some way or another, depending on the main counteroffensive direction.
I expect a hybrid initiative from the West, such as the dirty bomb, plus providing long rang missiles that would further damage the Kerch bridge and an international setback for Russia (such as a new Turkish president or Saudi MBS imposing limited sanctions to Russia), all at the same time, and then offering to set up peace talks, expecting that magically Russia will give up due to the PR setbacks.
Awesome stuff! Are you sure your name isn't Andrei?
You make a good case for the CO being in Artemovsk. I am not sure about the destruction of Wagner. They're flanked by Russian military and the place is already destroyed. They can retreat and bomb them all the way to Valhalla. NATO would get their PR win ("Look how weak Russia is. They've been fighting for this town for 11 months and we took it back in 2 week").
Dear Aleks, greetings!
I would like to develop a little more your point about an "insertion offensive" towards Mariupol.
However, there is quite a distance between the line of contact (say, Ugledar) and Mariupol. The Russians may halt the Ukrainians advance in between.
Would there be another target for such "insertion offensive" by the Ukrainians, which is closer to the line of contact, and even better (politically speaking) than Mariupol for them?
I believe that yes -- Donetsk (the city, not the oblast).
I would like to know your thoughts about this. Thank you.
There's an opinion regarding Kharkov that NATO-Ukraine were actively provoked to start an offensive exactly there in order to draw them from other areas and wear them down. Also it might've affected attitudes in russian society towards partial mobilization which began shortly afterwards.
I have a feeling that something is missing. Of course, it is not possible to take it into account during the analysis. As incredible as it may seem, I would still take into account the greater involvement of NATO or "allies" in the conflict than the current one. The West has invested too much to afford any other option than victory or the conditions for the "Minsk Agreements 3" as a precondition for the destabilization and disintegration of Russia. I think that Russia will have to take a more active role in "responses" to the West than it currently does.
I find it impossible to empathize with people who would take up arms against Russia in defense of Drag Queen Story Hour and pediatric gender clinics. Would I have preferred that they didn't? Certainly, but they have, so that is irrelevant.
P.S. I believe the doctrine Russia employed in Kherson and Kharkov is called maneuver defense, not mobile defense, but I could be wrong.
I wonder about what's next? What happens after the last Ukrainian is down and out. I don't think there is any doubt that NATO is planning to expand into Finland, Georgia, Odessa or where ever they get the chance. Will Russia be willing to take on NATO directly to push them back to pre-expansion position?
Superb. The best analysis I have seen this far.
I can imagine that a lot of Ukrainian soldiers are going AWOL. If it were me, I certainly would take my chances - in the end it doesn't who shoots you dead, but if there's even a slight hope of escaping.
The west does not want negotiations, that is true. And after the recent drone attack on the Kremlin, the possibilities for negotiations are smaller than ever.
Thank you Aleks 👍🏼
It can be only hoped that the strikes in the rear will be enough to prevent any massive offensives. Ukraine/Nato has done a very good job in suppressing information from the results, in order to have the best chance of launching an attack (regardless of the odds and suppressing knowledge of odds, or available equipment) and have the best possible moral.
I also recall reading earlier this year that the actual Nato plan for an offensive was actually three separate waves. The first one was the mobilized cannon fodder wave to suppress or wear down the defense, second was supposed to be "legacy USSR" equipment and tanks, and the final wave the "best Nato trained" mechanized or mobile brigades, probably for PR and optics against least resistance. I don't know whether that's still part of the plan or not, but I'd guess that at this point they can't afford to separate Nato or legacy USSR troops or equipment. Throwing the "worst" troops first is probably a valid strategy, albeit disgusting.
Stoltenberg also recently advertised that Nato has delivered "98% of promised equipment" to Ukraine. Hopefully a large portion of that is already gone from rear area strikes, but it'll remain to be seen.