The (Non)Surprise [i]

Ukraine in Trouble

Introduction

Russia's recent incursion into Kharkov has been a shock for some, while for others, it was anticipated. For Ukraine, it may signify the end. Let’s delve into this ongoing crisis for Ukraine.

Ukraine

In January 2023, I penned a piece outlining what I believed would be the most likely sequence of events in the conflict in Ukraine. To my astonishment, the events of the subsequent 18 months unfolded almost precisely as I had foreseen. I encourage everyone to revisit this article as my predictions remain relevant, and we have now entered stage four (of five). The fifth stage is yet to unfold.

I will reiterate several of this article’s assumptions here.

You can see on the map below the division of the Ukrainian border into five theatres of war:

We are currently witnessing the activation of the fourth theatre. In the old article, I wrote the following explanation:

Theatre 4

As the map shows, theatre 4 is long, extending far to the North and West.

For the time being, as I write this article, I don’t see any physical possibility to conduct a large-scale offensive from Belarus into Ukraine. There is neither enough equipment nor the needed logistics in place. So, big arrows from Belarus are currently impossible.

What I assume, indeed, is the following. We will see locally, not everywhere where I put a number 4 on it, but at certain places (I don’t know where), small incursions to pin and bind the enemy in close proximity to the border. To engage as many troops, equipment, and logistical efforts in the north as possible. At the same time, I assume that we could start experiencing the start of a Russian air campaign on targets across the northern border of Ukraine. Since most air defenses are currently concentrated around the critical infrastructure or already depleted, we will most likely see the new role of General Surovikin. Hammering and degrading Ukrainian resources in the north. And Ukraine will need to replace them constantly, not to open the door to Kiev.

At the same time, we could maybe see the accumulation of troops and equipment in Belarus.

This could go on maybe until the start of the summer 2023.

Here we have the same situation as in Artemovsk. As soon as the supply of troops and equipment starts ebbing in the north, Russia can assume that the time is right to secure Kiev.

Requirements for a move on Kiev:

·        Complete collapse of the Donbass front.

·        Complete Collapse of the northern front.

Depending on the political situation, we could see here already a full surrender or only the moving in of Russian troops to a close proximity of Kiev. Maybe even already the start of the surrounding of Kiev.

Is more explanation needed?

Yes. A lot has happened since that article, and I think it would make sense to update my assessment and explain what is going on (at least what I think is going on), even if I predicted things correctly.

First, what happened?

Some might have missed it. Russia crossed the border into the “Ukrainian” oblast of Kharkov from the Belgorod region and quickly captured more than a dozen villages and towns in the proximity of the border. At the time of writing, Russia is taking the important towns of Volchansk and Liptsy.

Why are these towns important? Because they are obstacles to approaching some vital supply lines in towns like Izyum and Kupyansk. And remember, Izyum is the key to Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, which would be the endgame for the Donbass theatre of war. We can see that on the map.

But first, let’s talk about tactics, operations, and strategy. Why did Russia enter Kharkov from this angle? To be honest, I have no inside information, but I will offer my assessment.

• Did Russia enter the Kharkov region to take Kharkov City?

  Definitely not. There will be no fighting, at least no major fighting, in large Russian cities. Which Kharkov definitely is. So, no, Russia is not going to approach Kharkov with the intention of liberating it by force. Don’t get me wrong. Kharkov will very soon be again under the Russian flag. But in this case, I’d rather say the highest probability is that the Ukrainian army will withdraw from Kharkov at some point.

  And the Russian troops will be in proximity to move in when that happens.

  But why would the Ukrainians withdraw from Kharkov? It is the second biggest “Ukrainian” city. And a major industrial center. Simply because it has no more value for the West. Everyone is aware that territory east of the Dnieper is lost anyway. Wasting more resources, which will be needed for holding the South, is not in NATO’s interest. The best fortification for the time being is to hold the South. Maintain a bridgehead to Crimea, which is priority 2 in Ukraine. Priority 1 is to hold Odessa since it has strategic military implications for NATO. I explained that in my recent analysis. Odessa is even more important than Kiev.

  So yes, there will either be a collapse of the Ukrainian Forces on the East Side of the Dnieper or a strategic withdrawal as soon as available reserves reach a critical level.

  Taking recent admissions by Budanov, Syrskyi, and Zelensky himself, we are not far away from this point. Brace yourself for some major changes soon 😊

• Did Russia enter in order to target Kharkov in retaliation for Belgorod?

  Definitely not. And Russia will not do that, even after it liberates the two cities, which will put her within striking distance of artillery. It is not going to happen. Kharkov is a Russian town with Russian people in it. It would be like targeting oneself.

  What Russia will do is to target military installations in and around Kharkov as well as logistics in and around Kharkov. By doing this, it will accelerate the decision by the Nazi authorities to abandon the city because it will become such a huge burden. Especially considering the huge meat grinders in the making in Donbass.

• Did Russia enter to secure the border against further incursions?

  Yes, that is an effect of this incursion. Was it the sole reason? No, I don’t think so. But it is a nice side effect. There are far more places at the border where provocations could still take place. And Ukrainian long-range weapons, unfortunately, still are attacking civilian installations in Belgorod.

• Did Russia enter to stretch the Ukrainian forces thin?

  Absolutely. This is one of the main reasons for the incursion. To ensure that Ukraine is stretched thin on all other front lines since their strategic reserves are depleted. They are dead and gone. Brigades are stretched over hundreds of kilometers and are no longer withdrawn for rebuilding but rather filled piecemeal with conscripts.

  That means that the density of brigades in frontline sections is reduced, which will accelerate the collapse of these frontline sections even further.

  As I asked in my previous article, will Chasov Yar need to be stormed or created into a meatgrinder, or will the front line collapse earlier due to missing reinforcements? Or will Kharkov be sacrificed to hold on to the Donbass a little longer?

  I don’t know. We will see. Don’t forget there are many more critical frontline sections than only the new Kharkov front lines and Chasov Yar. And all of them need personnel… This is going to end very badly very soon… At least for the Ukrainians on the East side of the Dnieper River.

• Did Russia enter to relieve other front lines?

  I think if Russia manages to advance, step by step, as the collapse of the enemy allows it southeast of Kharkiv city, it will be able to take vital supply lines of the Ukrainians under fire control. Supply lines from Kharkov City to the eastern front lines in the Kharkov region (Kupyansk, for example).

Let’s check a map:

Source: https://ukraine.liveuamap.com

Here are several things to discuss:

• As always, we must distinguish between strategy, operation, and tactics.

  • Strategic moves have a significant impact on the war as a whole.

  • Operational moves have a significant impact on a particular theatre of war. The move itself could be happening with the theatre of war where the impact is desired or it could happen in a remote theatre of war to cause an effect somewhere else.

  • Tactical moves serve solely to try to improve a certain situation on a particular frontline section.

• Would Russia go into Volchansk and Liptsy just for the sake of harassing Ukrainian troops in and around Kharkov (a tactical move)? NO!

• If Russia moved to take the Kharkov supply routes under fire control, that would be an operational move. This is not possible yet, since Russia has gone only to the east of Kharkov city, and the supply routes are west of the city. Further developments here will reveal the intentions of the Russian forces.

  To block Kharkov, an incursion from another angle would be needed, possibly from somewhere around the Russian border town of Greyvoron (marked on the map). Moreover, Slatyne would have to be liberated, and the logistical situation on the east front of Kharkov Oblast would become untenable for Ukraine. In this situation, Ukrainian Forces stationed there would be in a dire situation and would need to be withdrawn.

• Properly implemented tactical and operational actions culminate in strategic success, such as taking Kharkov city without (costly) direct action in street-to-street fighting in the city. Such a situation is developing around Kharkov, and I expect this overall strategy includes further incursions to the west of Kharkov city and in Sumy. Ultimately, this strategy could include action to the west of Kiev, although I expect the Kiev campaign to begin later when the Armed Forces of Ukraine are near defeat. And Kiev would be like the Kharkov campaign, just securing wedges east and west of Kiev, like what was done in 2022.

  But let’s come back to strategy. As described already, Ukraine has almost completely lost its strategic reserves. It can only plug the holes in existing brigades with conscripts. The small number of NATO-trained soldiers trickling in occasionally is too low to make a difference.

  Opening a new front line, which requires a new logistics infrastructure for major operations, can be considered a strategic move regardless of its size. It is a strategic move to finish off an enemy that is on its back heels. This is the consideration of the Ukrainian troops east of the Dnieper.

  Which brings me to my conclusion: If a move, even if it is as small as the current Russian incursion north of Kharkov city, has a major influence on the major theatres of war, then it is a strategic move.

  In other words, Russia has executed the first step of a strategic chain of events to comprehensively defeat Ukraine and make it unconditionally surrender in its entirety. Unfortunately, many Ukrainians and Russians will still die by the time it is concluded.

What is interesting is the question of why there were no fortifications on the Ukrainian side. The question is a bit more complicated than it seems.

There is an easy approach: Ukrainian Corruption. And yes, I’m sure Ukrainian corruption played a role.

But that cannot be the only reason. A military organization is big and consists of many officers. Some of the Ukrainian officers are, at least to some degree, fighting because they bought into the Western propaganda. Hence, they want to defend themselves, their soldiers, and their country.

It is impossible that not a single officer out of many did not complain or report/leak somehow about missing fortifications on the border. After all, missing fortifications means a significantly higher casualty rate on the Ukrainian side and, potentially, these officers themselves if the first lines cannot hold the enemy back.

Moreover, there is NATO. Most of the operations are coordinated by NATO. And enough NATO personnel are running around in Ukraine and inspecting the military installations to check the readiness. American personnel are very active in overseeing their investments.

Then, there were both Ukrainian military units and GUR operators invading Russian territory in this direction. They would need to go through “defensive lines” to reach the Russian border. Budanov, who is the head of the GUR and is now attacking Syirsky, would have had very accurate intelligence about the situation. His department planned operations in detail in this region.

All of this is bullshit. And yes, corruption as well. A good combination for Ukrainians.

I personally think that the situation was well known in Kiev and in Washington as well. But decisions were made not to focus resources in this direction, because it was more important to plug holes at other front lines. So, after assessing the risk of an invasion from the north and coming to the conclusion that the risk is low, they may have decided against it.

Once it became clear that Russia might invade soon, it was too late. You can’t build fortifications with the enemy at the front door. At least not effective fortifications. And with what resources? To put it mildly, Ukrainian “resources” are dying everywhere faster than ever. As far as I am aware, Ukrainians are now dying in far greater numbers than ever before. Numbers of 1700 dead and critically wounded per day are now nothing unusual.

And Russia exploited that. As far as I am aware, Russia invaded with a small number of mobile troops, most of which were highly trained special forces to overcome the first obstacles. Later in the day, regular motorized Army battalions were introduced, and they keep pouring in now after the border was opened.

To be fair, it is extremely difficult to anticipate an attack with such a strategy. Nevertheless, I’m sure it was known to everyone who should have known it. Even I wrote about the imminent incursion a few days before it happened. But many others did as well.

Here is a snippet from my previous article, two days before it happened:

See here.

I think Budanov, Syirsky, and Zelensky knew about the state of the “fortifications” and are leveraging the situation now against one another. And… the Russians knew as well 😊

Still, I want to issue an important warning. Budanov publicly talked about the dire situation of the Ukrainian forces and the availability of human resources. He is the chief of military intelligence. Everything he says has a purpose. And no, the Ukrainian command structure is not crumbling yet, so everyone is doing and saying what he wants. Budanov has a purpose.

Even though lives would be saved if the Ukrainians were close to total collapse, I think they will be able to hold the east side of the Dnieper for at least one or two months, if not more.

Maybe the large-scale public whining and fighting of Budanov, Syirsky, and Zelensky is rather directed at the European and American public and their politicians to trigger XYZ, with XYZ being more weapons, troops on the ground, approval to strike Russian infrastructure, etc. After all, we saw Anthony Blinken popping up in Ukraine instantly. The public bickering had some effect.

Robert Fico

The latest information I received before I conclude this article is that the Slovak Premier, Robert Fico, was seriously wounded by an assailant.

1. Robert Fico apparently survived and had several surgeries and is now conscious. More is not known as of the time of writing.

2. The assailant apparently was a “lone wolf” who “didn’t like” Fico… Okay…

In my experience, such events are never isolated. Maybe this guy even thinks he was a lone wolf. Nevertheless, there is a high probability that he was somehow radicalized.

By now, I thought the West would never dare an attempt on one of its own leaders, even though he might make them uncomfortable. The days of Kennedy “incidents” are long gone. And now this… Pandora’s box is apparently open, and anything can now happen in the West.

I’ll continue this another time when there is more information. It doesn’t make sense now to speculate.

Aristotle

Today, I prepared something philosophical for you.

As far as I know, the concept of “Premise and Conclusion” (Syllogism) goes back to Aristotle. You can correct me in the comment section if I’m wrong.

However, he defined the following construction:

Premise 1: Humans are mortal.

Premise 2: All Greeks are humans.

Conclusion: All Greeks are mortal.

As we all know, there is currently an epic disaster unfolding in Gaza for the Palestinian people. To be more precise, in Rafah. Organized by the criminal regime in Israel. (Killing a whole people because of apparently 1,000 dead?)

Which leads me to the following Premise/Conclusion formula:

Premise 1: Palestinians are Semites.

Premise 2: The Zionist regime in Israel tries to “get rid” of the Palestinians.

Conclusions: Zionists are Antisemitic.

I’d like to conclude with this conclusion… 😊

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[i] Edited by Piquet (EditPiquet@gmail.com)